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Abstract:
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) have emerged in the last few decades as a
mechanism for a state to overcome widespread, grave, human rights violations. There are
numerous approaches to a TRC all with an ultimate goal: that formerly warring factions,
perpetrators, witnesses, and victims can move forward as a united people. I propose that
the provision of amnesty is critical to the success of a TRC. I hypothesize that the form
of amnesty chosen (i.e. blanket v. conditional amnesty) determines the revelation of truth
and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can achieve
reconciliation. To test this hypothesis, I use two case studies: South Africa, which has
utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed blanket amnesty. I
create a model for measuring reconciliation. I can then look at the implications of both
types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective. My overarching
conclusion is that the provision of conditional amnesty is more effective than blanket
amnesty in achieving reconciliation. Ultimately, I hope that this conclusion can be
generalized to other TRCs.
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Introduction
“I am a farmer. My father is dead. I have no mother. I have two wives. I
have six children. I live at S. The rebels came from K; they met me at S; I
ran away. When I ran, my children left me; I was left behind. The rebels
surrounded us. They catch us; six of us. They catch me; they tied me; they
killed my companions. . . . They tied me on a post. When they are ready to
go, they brought a bench. They said “Put your hand” and I said, “Oh
God.” So they asked me, “Do you have a God?” . . . They cut off my hand.
They cut off both of my hands. Then they left me there. I could not run too
far, and I fell down. I cried. I said, “Oh God, I am finished for life. I am
finished” (Kelsall 2005, 370).

The above is an excerpt of Sesay Ballah’s testimony given at the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Hearings in Tonkolili, Sierra Leone on July 8, 2003 (Kelsall
2005, 370). His story is comparable to so many other victims of human rights abuses all
over the world. The physical and psychological implications of what he has had to
endure will stay with him, and forever impact his ability to be self sufficient. Imagine
this victim is you, or one of your parents, siblings, sons or daughters. Imagine the
perpetrator of these crimes is your neighbor, or another member of your community.
Could you forgive them? Could you release the desire for vengeance? Would telling
your story and hearing their apology be sufficient to let bygones be bygones? These
questions are paramount to a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) as they
determine whether the revelation of truth, with a provision of amnesty, can really lead to
reconciliation.
A TRC is one method of a larger process called transitional justice. Transitional
justice is the process by which a society slowly recovers and moves forward after wide
spread human rights abuses. It marks a transition toward democracy. “The challenge for
a new democracy is to respond appropriately to past evils without undermining the new
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democracy or jeopardizing prospects for future development” (Crocker 2000, 100).
When new leaders replace a corrupt regime and make the choice to pursue transitional
justice, many crucial decisions follow. There are numerous tools of transitional justice,
the most obvious of which is criminal prosecution. The choice to prosecute often
depends upon the severity of the crime, and compliance with international law (Siegel
1998, 433). Another approach is state sponsored reparations programs which can be
offset financially by allowing civil suit against perpetrators. Yet another choice is
whether or not to establish a TRC. I will focus my thesis on this final mechanism.
Once the leaders of a transitional government decide to instate a TRC, they must
make other choices regarding which tools are most effective in achieving a commission’s
goal. Where the TRC is held, and whether it travels around a state, will be important in
terms of who gets to testify. Whether the testimonies will be public or private may
influence those who are testifying, with the general population as an audience. The
decision to grant amnesty and the form it takes also has significant implications. A state
may choose to work with a prosecution mechanism, or it may choose to give partial
amnesty (to children or for minor crimes, for instance). A state may give conditional
amnesty in exchange for a certain expectation of truth, or it may choose to give blanket
amnesty to all perpetrators. This leads me to the question: does the provision of one type
of amnesty or another undercut justice in a TRC, and as a result, inhibit reconciliation?
The final choice, of what extent to provide amnesty as a tool of a TRC, is the
focus of my research. There are such varying views of whether it is beneficial or
detrimental, that I think it is crucially important to analyze through the use of a
comparative case study. I hypothesize that the form of amnesty chosen determines the
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revelation of truth and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can
achieve reconciliation. To test this hypothesis, I will analyze two case studies: South
Africa, which has utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed
blanket amnesty. I will create a model for measuring reconciliation. I can then look at
the implications of both types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective.
At the conclusion of my data section it becomes apparent that South Africa,
having utilized conditional amnesty, scores higher on the composite reconciliation score
than does Sierra Leone; which granted blanket amnesty. The provision of conditional
amnesty, coupled with the South African TRC’s power to subpoena witnesses, provided a
tangible incentive for perpetrators, victims, and witnesses to testify. Sierra Leone did not
offer such a concrete incentive and as a direct result, their collection of truth suffered.
On the other hand Sierra Leone did an impressive job with their efforts toward restorative
justice, a lesson from which South Africa could take some pointers. Ultimately, I hope
that this conclusion can be generalized to other TRCs in an effort to achieive the highest
level of reconciliation.

Literature Review
There is a growing interest internationally in restorative justice, which seeks to
provide peace for the victims of human rights crimes (Graybill and Lanegran 2004).
From this motive comes the concept of a TRC. According to the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “these commissions—officially
sanctioned, temporary, non-judicial investigative bodies—are granted a relatively short
period for statement-taking, investigations, research and public hearings, before
completing their work with a final public report” (2006, 8). My question is: does the
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provision of amnesty undercut justice in a TRC, and in so doing, inhibit reconciliation?
Or is it a beneficial tool for a commission to use? There is a long history of debate
revolving around amnesty. In broaching this research, I will explore the goals of a
commission, including what justice and reconciliation mean in this context; how a
commission seeks to achieve reconciliation (i.e. the varying approaches TRC’s employ);
and the pros and cons of the choice to utilize amnesty.

Justice
Truth itself does not inevitably lead to reconciliation. Underlying the goal of
reconciliation is the concept of justice. It is necessary to address the different approaches
to justice prior to defining reconciliation. Justice is a relative term. Its definition varies
depending upon who is asked, and under what circumstances. This could fall on a
spectrum anywhere from the age old concept of “an eye for an eye,” to more formal legal
action, to some sort of compensatory payment. Two distinct approaches to justice define
the boundaries of the spectrum: retribution and reparation (Lambourne 1999, 4).
Retribution involves some sort of punishment for a perpetrator. Elster
investigates the concept of retributive emotions, those underlying emotions on the part of
the victims which feed a desire for retribution (2006, 34-35). He states that there are five
contributing emotional factors: anger, two sources of indignation (one in response to
observing unjust behavior, the second from observing the unjust fortune of an individual),
contempt, and hatred. Retributive emotions are generated through disapproval of both
the actions of an actor, and their personal character. In terms of justice, the question is
whether or not these emotions can be resolved without retribution. Retribution can take
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the form of prosecution. It can also act as deterrence for the future by means of
establishing precedents that human rights violations will not go unpunished.
Reparations, according to Hayner, involve a number of methods of redress,
including “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non
repetition” (2001, 171). Restitution is a form of compensation (generally monetary)
which aims at making amends to the victims. After widespread state conflict involving
human rights abuses, the corresponding recovery will need to be both physical and
mental. Frequently the repercussions of being damaged both physically and
psychologically are economic. Though a financial sum cannot make up for the loss of a
loved one, for example, it nonetheless provides assistance as a sort of symbolic apology.
This is complicated in a TRC as sometimes there are amnesty provisions instituted by a
past regime, in its own self interest, that intentionally do not allow for a case (either civil
or criminal) to be brought against alleged perpetrators (Hayner 2001, 170). That is not to
say there are not other approaches to reparations. A truth commission which effectively
reveals the truth, a state which acknowledges responsibility, and perpetrators who
apologize for their actions, all offer some form of satisfaction to the victims.

Retributive v. Restorative Justice
All TRC’s have the choice of whether to pursue retributive or restorative justice.
Which approach is most likely to contribute to reconciliation? Restorative justice (which
includes reparations and restitution) seems to place more emphasis on healing as a
community rather than punishing an individual. It embraces the sentiment of forgiveness
and falls neatly into the Christian theology that some truth commissions, primarily South
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Africa’s, have utilized. By contrast, retributive justice is employed to avoid individuals
taking it upon themselves to seek vengeance. “Retribution motivates punishment out of
fairness to those who have been wronged and reflects a belief that wrongdoers deserve
blame and punishment in direct proportion to the harm inflicted” (Minow 1998, 12).
One limit of retributive justice is that, in many cases, it will never be enough. It
cannot fix the damage done, and there is no way the punishment could be proportional to
the crime. Aukerman demonstrates a common concern regarding a cycle of revenge
which could result from a retributive approach: “…nor does sympathy for the retributive
victim’s desire that her wrongdoer suffer necessarily mean that such suffering is justified,
or even morally right. As Nino argues, retributivism ‘presupposes that it is sometimes
appropriate to redress one evil with another evil. However, when I add the evil of the
crime to the evil of the punishment . . . my moral arithmetic leads me consistently to
believe that we have ‘two evils’ rather than ‘one good’” (Aukerman 2002, 56).
Minow argues that if “the longer-term goals include avoiding cycles of revenge,
social reintegration of at least lower-level perpetrators should be pursued. In many
circumstances, demonizing all on ‘that side’ means demonizing large segments of the
society, including many individuals who believed they were acting for a larger good or
who acted out of fear or who rationalized their conduct in other ways” (Minow 1998,
121-122). This brings up a second critique of retributive justice: the concept of blame
and, as Aukerman (2002) puts it, character evaluations. In large scale conflict, especially
when there are human rights abuses on all sides, it is difficult to assign blame to an
individual. “The central premise of individual responsibility portrays defendants as
separate people capable of autonomous choice—when the phenomena of mass atrocities
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render that assumption at best problematic” (Aukerman 2002, 46). For instance, an
individual could be acting in the interest of safety for his family, or his career, especially
in the case of lower-level perpetrators. This does not excuse their actions, but it might
make restorative justice a more appealing option, particularly when there are violations
on all sides.

Reconciliation
According to K. Asmal, L. Asmal, and Roberts, reconciliation is the “ending of
the divisive cycle of accusation, denial and counter-accusation; not a forgetting of these
accusations and counter-accusations, but more a settling of them through a process of
evaluation” (1996, 47). This is a very simple and straightforward definition which,
though a good starting point, does not begin to fully illuminate the vast debate
surrounding it. Slye requires more, calling for not only accountability, but also for a
“human rights culture” whose members respect fundamental human rights (2000, 171). I
will address three significant issues surrounding the concept of reconciliation: how
forgiveness factors into reconciliation, and the necessity of justice, and the necessity of
truth.
Forgiveness is part of the exchange between victims and perpetrators which leads
to reconciliation in society. In some cases it is seen as a responsibility of the victim, an
expectation. The emphasis put on forgiveness varies from region to region depending
upon societal norms. Communities strongly influenced by Christian theology such as
South Africa are more likely to incorporate notions of forgiveness into their truth
commission (Kelsall 2005). There are other countries, however, such as Sierra Leone, in
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which the notions of forgiveness are less culturally salient (Kelsall 2005). Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, who presided over South Africa’s TRC, advocated for the importance of
forgiveness in reconciliation. He employed the values of Ubuntu, and encouraged it as
the only path to follow in South African’s TRC (Gibson 2004, 13). Ubuntu is a
philosophy that embraces social solidarity and restorative justice. It calls for forgiveness
to lead to peace and reconciliation (Gibson 2004, 263). “As Desmond Tutu said in 1985
when resisting apartheid’s reformist machinations, ‘it is the victims, not the perpetrators,
who must say when things are better or not’” (R. Asmal, L. Asmal, and Roberts 1996,
49). By forgiving, the victims can acknowledge a change and begin the process of
moving forward.
There is opposition to this philosophy on the part of those who feel too much
emphasis is put on forgiveness. Wilson says “Ubuntu was ‘used to sell a reconciliatory
version of human rights talk to black South Africans’” (Graybill 2002, 359). He is not
alone in his concern that the victims carry the burden of reconciliation and are
stigmatized if they don’t accept apologies and relinquish anger or desire for retribution
(Graybill 2002; Graybill and Lanegran 2004).
A related debate in defining reconciliation is the question of how justice factors
in. Is it a necessary component? Advocates of forgiveness and Ubuntu, may indeed not
desire retributive justice, but what of restorative justice? Former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated, "There are times when we are told that justice must be set aside in the
interests of peace. It is true that justice can only be dispensed when the peaceful order of
society is secure. But we have come to understand that the reverse is also true: without
justice, there can be no lasting peace" (Annan, 2003). Justice is a necessary component
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of differentiating between the goals of an old corrupt regime, and the goals of a new one.
“Truth commissions, in general, and the TRC, in particular, purport to be attempts to
balance the independent forces of both justice and reconciliation. If the priority is simply
to bring past offenders to book, to demonstrate respect for the rule of law, and to mark off
the new democracy from its unjust predecessor, then trials seem to be the obvious
mechanism to adopt” (Allen 1999, 320). TRC’s are created with a different purpose from
trials: TRC’s do aim to bring peace and reconciliation through truth, and do not simply
depend on retributive measures. Minow supports this latter notion that retributive and
restorative justice should coexist, and argues that reconciliation should be achieved in
tandem (Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 5).
Finally, there is the consequence of truth for reconciliation. On one end of the
spectrum, it is argued that truth is of primary importance. At minimum, partial truths
offer something to the families of human rights victims. “Even imperfect truth
commissions produce a wealth of previously unknown information” which in itself can
lead to a sense of closure for the victims and their families (Tepperman 2002, 139).
On the other end of the spectrum, the import of truth is questioned all together and
potentially displaced by the ritual of truth-telling in an effort to lead to reconciliation.
Hayner suggests that the ritual of truth telling consists of simply allowing victims to give
their testimony as the act in itself may be intrinsically cathartic and sufficient for
reconciliation (2001). “By speaking of trauma, survivors regain lost worlds and lost
selves” (Minow 2000, 243). Making this private experience public can also be cathartic
to those who are an audience for the proceedings (whether they are a victim, or not).
Minow hypothesizes that TRC’s humanize the perpetrators and empower the victims so
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that everyone becomes human again, a necessary condition for reconciliation (2000, 254).
Kelsall focuses on the truth commission of Sierra Leone and questions the necessity of
truth itself. He argues there are many reasons the truth was withheld, yet the process
continued. It culminated in a “staged ceremony of repentance and forgiveness” which he
concludes was successful in achieving its original goal of reconciliation despite its
failures in exposing the truth (2005, 380).
Wilson disagrees with the acceptance of an incomplete truth, but believes truth is
the key to reconciliation (2001). He cites Benedict Anderson, who argues, “The
formulation of a shared national past is simultaneously the basis of the assertion of a
shared national future” (Wilson 2001, 14). In other words, truth is a prerequisite for
reconciliation.

Amnesty
Forgiveness, justice, and truth are all aspects of reconciliation to varying degrees,
as explained above. But there is one decision concerning how a TRC is designed which
can either help or inhibit reconciliation: namely, how a commission wants to utilize
amnesty. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, amnesty is most simply “a pardon
extended by the government to a group or class of persons, for a political offense”
(2004). It is understood that “forgiveness is deemed more expedient for the public
welfare than prosecution and punishment” (Black’s Law Dictionary 2004).
Some might argue that forgive-and-forget is the best policy, that condoning
“amnesia” as the best way to move forward as a country (Graybill and Lanegran 2004,
1124). Graybill (2004) identifies three different approaches to amnesty and elaborates
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each of them with accompanying case studies. The first is “pardon” (as in the case of
South Africa) involving conditional amnesty. Here, amnesty may be granted in exchange
for full disclosure of the truth on the part of the perpetrator (R. Asmal, L. Asmal, and
Roberts 1996, 16). The second is “punishment” (as in the case of Rwanda) where
traditional, local courts (called Gacâca courts) are established to try perpetrators. Finally
“amnesia” (in the case of Mozambique) involves collective forgetting. When deciding
whether to hold a TRC, the transitional government in Mozambique determined that
publicly airing grievances would lead to more conflict and that collective amnesty for all
sides was the best way to leave the past behind (Graybill and Lanegran 2004).
In addition, there are also “blanket and “self” amnesty approaches. The case of
Mozambique is one form of “blanket amnesty”. A prior regime may also establish a
provision of “self-amnesty” which protects the regime’s leaders when they are no longer
in power (Young 2002, 216). Taking into consideration these approaches to amnesty, I
will explore whether the provision of differing types of amnesty undercuts justice or truth
and, in turn, inhibits reconciliation.

Amnesty and justice
R. Asmal, L. Asmal, and Roberts support the idea that “the looming threat of
criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts would furnish an incentive for perpetrators to
approach [a truth] commission on a voluntary basis and seek reconciliation through
genuine contrition” (1996, 24). They argue this is more advantageous for reconciliation
than forcing perpetrators to testify in a retributive setting. Markel agrees, and is willing
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to sacrifice retributive justice, to some extent, in favor of the revelation of truth which is
necessary for reconciliation and nation-building (1999, 391).
Theissen counters by questioning whether the provision of amnesty in fact aligns
with international law, as it allows for human rights violations to go unpunished
(Theissen 2004, 7). Greenawalt agrees that amnesties given to people responsible for
grave war crimes are in fact unjust, and argues further that those given for political
reasons alone can also be considered unjust (2000, 195-196). He points to the
inconsistency in cases of TRC’s in which those who are responsible for serious crimes
against humanity may be granted amnesty, while those responsible for unrelated but more
minor crimes will likely be charged. (This is a result of narrow TRC mandates which
only provide amnesty for politically motivated crimes.)

Amnesty and truth
There is a concern that amnesty does not in fact lead to the revelation of truth. In
the case of blanket amnesty, while there is no longer a risk of punishment, there is also no
incentive to tell the truth. Graybill and Lanegran discuss Sierra Leone’s blanket amnesty
as a statement of forgiveness (2004, 10). They question whether blanket amnesty alone
would lead to reconciliation. Even within the context of conditional amnesty, there are
situations in which suspected perpetrators know there is not enough evidence against
them to prosecute, and so feel no need to state the truth to the amnesty commission or to
admit guilt (Graybill 2002, 70-71). Others claim they do not remember what happened or
blame the effects of trauma for gaps in their testimony (Graybill 2002, 73).
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Greenawalt views some form of amnesty as a prerequisite for an effective truth
commission. He hypothesizes that “political opponents, may provide the commission
with necessary cooperation only if they are assured that they, and those they care about,
will receive amnesty” (2000, 191). He argues the effectiveness of a commission, and its
ability to reveal truth, depends upon a provision of amnesty. This is supported by Minow
who argues that “the conditional amnesty process does not foreclose truth-seeking, but
instead promotes it,” in reference to South Africa’s TRC (1998, 56). Slye argues that
there is a difference in how a perpetrator approaches a trial versus a truth commission. In
a trial, perpetrators invariably seek to evade liability and attempt to raise doubts about
their culpability so as to avoid punishment. In a truth commission with an amnesty
provision, they are more active participants, and in the case of conditional amnesty it is in
their best interest to convey the whole truth (2000, 173).
The concepts of truth, justice, amnesty, and reconciliation are all intertwined, and
arguably codependent. “The final document of the Chilean Rettig Commission states
that, ‘only upon a foundation of truth [is] it possible to meet the basic demands of justice
and to create the necessary conditions for achieving national reconciliation’” (Wilson
2001, 13-14). Amnesty can serve as a tool in augmenting truth and justice, which can be
effective together (Sikkink and Walling 2007). In answering my question of which form
of amnesty best promotes reconciliation, I must first define reconciliation in terms of
truth and justice.
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Research Design
Looking at the literature surrounding a TRC, there are numerous independent
variables which could influence the prospects for reconciliation. Some of these
independent variables include: the international relationships that a country maintains,
and whether other countries or NGO’s are contributing to their post conflict peacebuilding process. The government structure (before, during, and after conflict) is also
important; it matters whether or not there is a new cast of leaders or significant overlap
with those of the past regime. A country’s economic structure and culture are also
influencing factors. All of these could affect the achievement of reconciliation. For my
thesis I will focus on one key independent variable, amnesty. I will explore variation in
the types of amnesty offered, and the effects of variation on reconciliation.
My thesis analyzes the relationship between the blanket and conditional amnesty
(i.e. independent variables), and the dependent variable, reconciliation, in the context of a
TRC. The research design will include a definition of each variable, and a hypothesis as
to their relationships. It will operationalize the definition of reconciliation and determine
how it can be measured. I will explore this relationship through analysis of two case
studies of transitional justice: South Africa, and Sierra Leone. Later I will explain why I
chose these case studies, and the nature of my data. Ultimately, I will analyze primary
and secondary source data to determine whether my hypothesis (i.e. that the choice of
amnesty directly affects the achievement of reconciliation) is supported or not, and some
possible outcomes.
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Independent variables: Forms of Amnesty
Amnesty is one of an assortment of tools of transitional justice. The purpose of
amnesty in a TRC varies from commission to commission, depending upon the specific
goals of the TRC. For my purposes, I will focus on the two of the most widely debated
forms of amnesty: blanket amnesty and conditional amnesty.
Blanket amnesty can be established in two forms. The first is known as selfamnesty, in which a regime builds amnesty into the legal system in order to protect
principals of the regime from any future prosecutions. A clear example of this took place
in Ghana, where the Rawlings administration “entrenched a self amnesty in the 1992
Constitution which barred any legal measures from being taken against members of either
the provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) or the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), both military regimes headed by Rawlings himself” (Valji 2006, 10).
The second is simply called blanket amnesty. It generally involves the granting of
unconditional amnesty to all individuals involved in politically motivated crimes
regardless of affiliations, and without requiring anything in return. It is instituted post
conflict, in the belief that it will facilitate reconciliation. Both Uruguay and Sierra Leone
employ this form of amnesty “in order to bring lasting peace” to their country (Evenson
2004, 737).
Conditional amnesty, as its name suggests, gives full or partial amnesty in
exchange for truth. Truth is distilled from victim, perpetrator, and witness testimony in
an effort to create a shared national history. Amnesty is usually given as a reprieve from
prosecution, but is often coupled with some form of reparations. One approach to
conditional amnesty was seen in Liberia, which has afforded amnesty to children and
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those responsible for more minor crimes. Another is seen in South Africa, which has
granted amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of crimes resulting from national conflict.
This thesis explores whether one form of amnesty or another positively affects the
prospects for reconciliation

Dependent Variable: Reconciliation
Many debates exist surrounding the concept of reconciliation, and few scholars
agree on one comprehensive definition. Some emphasize truth, while others require
justice, forgiveness, or simply an end to conflict. In my view, each of these aspects is
important; hence, I conclude that reconciliation is a process which involves forging a
balance between truth and restorative justice after extensive internal conflict. The two
are not mutually exclusive, but rather are codependent if reconciliation is to be
determined successful; they each offer crucial aspects.
Truth consists of victims, witnesses, and perpetrators giving testimony and
together reconstructing an accurate narrative of past events, i.e. a national historical
record in the context of transitional justice (Wilson 2001, 14). It also involves
acknowledging responsibility (whether on the part of the state as a whole or on the part of
the individual people). Only by creating a process through which individual people can
engage in truth-telling is a state able to rebuild itself after massive internal conflict. The
collaboration of all sides is an important feature of reconciliation.
The literature review outlined the debate between proponents of retributive justice
and those of restorative justice. In my definition of reconciliation, I emphasize a
restorative approach. Restorative justice is a collective effort towards healing as a
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community. It involves awarding reparations to the victims of previous abuse in an
attempt to redress past wrongs. Reparations consist of rehabilitation both for the victim
(in terms of mental and physical assistance), as well as for the perpetrator (in an effort to
ease them back into the community as a law abiding citizen). Restorative justice also
strives for non-repetition of abuse, based on learning from the past. It is thus contingent
on the revelation of truth and involvement of all groups in society. A final characteristic
of restorative justice is that perpetrators are required to provide restitution to their
victims. This could include monetary compensation for past offenses either by individual
perpetrators, or the state; community service on the part of the perpetrator, so that they
may contribute to the rebuilding of a nation; and contrition on the part of a perpetrator,
who acknowledges responsibility.

Model and Hypothesis:
Having defined two approaches to amnesty and having defined reconciliation, I
can now lay out the causal relationship between the two concepts which I want to explore
in this thesis. I hypothesize that the decision of whether to utilize blanket amnesty or
conditional amnesty (independent variables) will ultimately determine whether a TRC is
successful or unsuccessful in achieving reconciliation (dependent variable).
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The following diagram presents a model of the independent variables and the four
possible outcomes of the dependent variable:

Figure: 1

Independent
Variables

Dependent
Variables
Reconciliation
Achievement of both truth
and justice (high)

Blanket Amnesty
Incomplete reconciliation
Fails to achieve both truth
and justice (low)

Choice of
Amnesty

Reconciliation
Achievement of both truth
and justice (high)

Conditional
Amnesty

Incomplete reconciliation
Fails to achieve both truth
and justice (low)

Operationalize the Dependent Variable:
My definition of reconciliation encompasses the realization of both truth and
restorative justice. Reconciliation is literally comprised of multiple inputs, as illustrated
below:
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Figure 2:

Reconciliation

Restorative Justice
(Reparations)

Truth

Victim
Testimony

Measures:

Perpetrator
Testimony
Scope/
Comprehensiveness
of the information

Rehabilitation

Implementation
of mechanism

Guarantee of
Non repetition
Memorial
efforts

Government
accountability
for reform

Access v.
restrictions to
commission

Restitution

Compensation

Monetary/
Benefits
Community
service

State Apology

Publicity and
awareness

Public opinion

This model helps to break down necessary components of reconciliation. The
first component is truth. To be effective, a TRC must elicit a high level of truth from
participants. This can be measured by characteristics of victim and perpetrator testimony.
First and foremost is the quality of the information. Does the information given actually
constitute truth? This is determined based upon whether testimony is corroborated by
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others in the form of a fellow victim or perpetrator, a victim confirming a violation on the
part of a perpetrator, or a perpetrator taking responsibility for the claim of a victim. Truth
also depends upon the scope/comprehensiveness of the information. Was there
widespread public awareness of the TRC and the information is elicited? Did everyone
have a chance to testify who wanted to do so? Was the mechanism itself accessible to the
general population? Answering “no” to any of these questions could result in the
exclusion of a segment of the population from the process. It is thus important that the
opportunity for full and complete truth-telling is not restricted.
The second component is justice, more specifically: restorative justice. Its three
subcomponents include: 1) rehabilitative efforts on behalf of both the victims and the
perpetrators; 2) the guarantee of non repetition; and 3) restitution. Rehabilitative
measures will include whether or not a state has rehabilitation programs available for
both the victim and the perpetrator. Common rehabilitation programs include those
geared towards the reintegration of child soldiers as well as ex-combatants; in addition to
programs which teach life skills such as farming in an attempt to help a person to become
more economically self sufficient.
The guarantee of non repetition is demonstrated by successfully assembling the
truth to illuminate past mistakes in order to avoid repetition in the future. Additionally, a
state taking responsibility for its actions and holding all perpetrators accountable can
demonstrate a commitment to change. It could also result from memorial efforts of the
state which include acknowledging wrongs done, honoring the victims, and vowing to
make a change. These frequently include physical memorials, public art, or a day of
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remembrance; and are most effective when created as a collaboration between victims,
perpetrators, and witnesses.
Restitution can be measured most easily in its monetary form, i.e. whether the
state or individual perpetrators must pay compensation, how much, or with what
frequency? Other forms of compensation could be paid through community service,
allowing the perpetrator to contribute a lasting benefit to the community, or to specific
victims. They could take the form of a perpetrator apologizing and publicly taking
responsibility for his or her actions.
The overall quality of justice can also be measured by public opinion of the TRC,
both in reference to the composition of truth and in reference to a specific restorative
justice program. This could consist of approval rates of the TRC, expressions of public
trust in the TRC, and opinions concerning the perceived success of the TRC. A
composite analysis of each of these measurements can help determine whether a high
level of truth and justice results from the provision of certain types of amnesty and thus a
high level of reconciliation.
In order to apply this model to my case studies, I will rank each indicator of
reconciliation on a scale from 1-3: 1 represents a low level of achievement of a given
measurement, 2 a moderate level, while a score of 3 signifies a high level of achievement.
I will then average the scores of each indicator under the respective truth and restorative
justice categories to create a composite score for each category. I will then average these
two scores together to get a final number representing a particular case study country’s
achievement of total reconciliation.
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Data Sources
Now that I have operationalized the definition of reconciliation, I will clarify how
I will gather my data for the measurements. The comparable information which
ultimately allowed me to choose my case studies was made available by the United States
Institute of Peace (USIP). This organization has compiled a database of forty-one TRC’s
which include the name, date, background information, charter, mandate, report, and
findings (if available) of each TRC. It is important to my research to look at the charter
and mandate of the South African and Sierra Leonean TRC’s so as to recognize: the goals
of each commission; their chosen approach toward amnesty; and the reasoning behind the
choice of amnesty provision. A review of the mandates also offers insight into how each
commission approaches reparations. The final report of each TRC also offers significant
data in terms of findings as well as recommendations from the commission to the
government. Typically, a TRC’s final report will recommend a rehabilitation mechanism
and a system of restitution for victims. I will also analyze examples of the testimony
given at the commissions by perpetrators and victims, as well as witnesses’ responses to
these testimonies.
Notably, Sierra Leone’s TRC put forth a statistical appendix to its final report.
This provides information about testimony given, as well as requests for restitution.
Comparable information is found in South Africa’s final report, which includes the report
of the amnesty committee reflecting upon the process and its achievements.
As indicated above, public opinion is also a good resource for judging the nature
of justice. The Campaign for Good Governance is an NGO in Sierra Leone which
conducted a public opinion poll measuring perceptions of the government post conflict
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(including its accountability, and efforts toward peace and reconciliation, among other
measures). Additionally, the scholar Amadu Sesay conducted a public opinion poll in
Sierra Leone, published in 2007. South Africa’s public opinion data comes from
Gibson’s extensive 2001 Truth and Reconciliation Survey which analyzes (but is not
limited to) public approval of amnesty, acceptance and knowledge of the TRC, as well as
perceived racial reconciliation.

Case Studies
I selected my cases from among a large pool of TRC's. According to the
International Center for Transitional Justice, there are forty-one TRC’s, including several
currently in progress. Others occurred in the same state more than once (i.e. Chile,
Ecuador, Germany, Nepal, Peru, Rwanda and Uganda). Not all of these are officially
defined as a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission”. Choosing my two case studies was
thus mostly a result of a process of elimination. For one, I wanted a comparative set of
case studies which were clearly defined as a truth and reconciliation commission. The
priority of goals became immediately apparent in the name of the commission. (To name
a few, South Korea’s commission is titled the Presidential Truth Commission on
Suspicious Deaths, Uruguay’s is the Commission for Peace, and Guatemala’s is the
Commission for Historical Clarification. Others such as Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and
Chile’s 2003 commission specify that they are investigative operations, while Ethiopia
and Rwanda work with a prosecution mechanism.) I thus limited the possibilities to
strictly “truth and reconciliation commissions” as determined by their title, charter, and
mandate. Within this significantly smaller pool, I looked at only commissions which
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utilized either blanket amnesty or conditional amnesty. (A few, including Ethiopia,
Paraguay and Peru, feed testimonies into a prosecution mechanism. The rest provide
some option for amnesty.) Furthermore, the countries selected for my comparative case
studies needed to have completed their TRC with a public report. My final pool for
conditional amnesty consisted of Algeria, which mandated conditional amnesty, but the
result of almost blanket, and South Africa which had a clear mechanism for amnesty
provisions. The pool for blanket amnesty was more expansive. I first eliminated those
such as Chile (2003-2005) and Ghana (2003-2004) which provided blanket amnesty for
the purpose of self-amnesty. From there I was left with Morocco, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Uruguay, and Sierra Leone. I eliminated Uruguay as its provision of blanket
amnesty is currently under review as unconstitutional. I then chose Sierra Leone over the
remaining two commissions as its final report was far more extensive than that of
Morocco (2004-2005), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003-2007) is still facing
a great amount of domestic unrest. As a result, I will be analyzing South Africa’s 19952002 Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, which employed conditional amnesty,
and Sierra Leone’s 2002-2004 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which provided
blanket amnesty.
It is important to qualify that in the field of transitional justice research, there is a
disproportionate focus on the South Africa TRC. Not only did it occur prior to the Sierra
Leone TRC but it was widely publicized internationally and viewed as a model upon its
creation. To this day, many comparative case studies include South Africa. Hence, data
is more widely available on South Africa than on Sierra Leone. For this reason my data
for the South Africa case study utilizes more of the quantitative and primary sources
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available while my data for Sierra Leone must rely on more qualitative and secondary
sources.

History: South Africa Conflict
The racial conflict in South Africa begins in the 1600’s when the Dutch East India
Company settled on the Cape of Good Hope. The settlers jointly became known as the
Afrikaner people. For the following century, they expanded their territory as well as their
numbers and the number of their slaves. An extensive conflict over land ensued between
the Afrikaners (also known as Trekboers, Dutch for wandering farmers) and the native
Khoikhoi and San tribes. Between the years of 1785 to 1795, Afrikaners extended further
into the north and killed thousands of San people while taking roughly 700 people
(primarily children) into custody to become slaves on Afrikaner farms (Gascoigne
2001b).
In 1795, a new conflict began to emerge: the British took control of Cape Town.
By this point the Afrikaners, relative to the English, were more indigenous to the region
and rejected British rule. They also opposed the British parliament’s new law abolishing
the slave trade. These emerging cultural differences led to what became know as the
“Great Trek” of Afrikaners who traveled north into the Zulu tribe’s region (South Africa,
U.S. State Department). In 1852 and 1854 two Boer republics were created from among
the Trekboer people: the Orange Free State and Tansvaal. Their already rocky
relationship with the English could not withstand the 1870 discovery of diamonds
followed by the 1886 discovery of gold in Boer territory (South Africa, U.S. State
Department). The English invaded, thereby prompting the Anglo-Boer Wars. The
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British emerged victorious and incorporated the two Boer republics into British property.
In May 1910, the two republics with the British colonies became South Africa. All
governing power was maintained by whites.
The African National Congress (ANC) was originally created in 1912 in
opposition to white domination, and with a goal of ending government restrictions on
blacks (Thema 1993, 88). The ANC was unsuccessful in resisting the growing
restrictions, and in 1948 the National Party (NP) won an all-white election and apartheid
(meaning “apartness”) laws were enacted (Gascoigne 2001b). These laws resulted in
state sponsored racism. Discrimination on the basis of race was institutionalized
everywhere, extending to a prohibition on inter-racial marriages, and exclusion from
specific jobs and restrictions on where a person of color could travel. In 1950, a
classification system was enacted that labeled South Africans as either white, black, or
colored (anything which was not clearly white or black). These classifications appeared
on identity cards and passes, which South Africans were required to carry for travel
outside of restricted areas. The passes determined if one was allowed into a white area.
This division was furthered in 1951 with the Bantu Authorities Act which created
“homelands” (South Africa, U.S. State Department). Many black South Africans were
restricted to living in homelands which supposedly (but often incorrectly) corresponded
to their ethnicity. In this way, they were completely disenfranchised from South Africa.
By 1981, four of these homelands were created as independent from South Africa. The
residents could not legally leave the homelands as they were no longer considered
citizens of South Africa. The 1953 Public Safety Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act
prohibited any anti-apartheid protests while at the same time increasing the government’s
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capability to instill consequences. A state of emergency was declared in 1960 in
response to protests of the ANC and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), which included
mass violence on the part of the government, resulting in 69 dead, 180 injured, and the
arrest of, among others, Nelson Mandela (South Africa, U.S. State Department). This
state of emergency was issued again and again until 1989 and led to grave human rights
violations. During this time a person could be detained by a police officer for 6 months
without a hearing. Thousands died while in detention, frequently as a result of torture.
Finally, in 1986, in response to mass national as well as international opposition
to apartheid, the South African government engaged Mandela in discussion. In 1990 the
official ban on the ANC, PAC, and other anti-apartheid groups ended, and Mandela was
released from prison. 1991 marked the elimination of the last laws which promoted
apartheid. In December of 1993 a new constitution was created, and on May 10, 1994
Nelson Mandela became president in South Africa’s first non apartheid election. The
South African Parliament established a mandate for the South African Commission of
Truth and Reconciliation in December of 1995, which would release its final report
publicly in 2003 (ICTJ, South Africa).

History: Sierra Leone Conflict
The history of conflict in Sierra Leone is a long one that extends back to the
colonial period. Between the years of 1787 to 1794, the British assisted in transporting
over 1000 freed slaves from London, the United States, and Nova Scotia, to what was to
be called Freetown on the most western point of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone, U.S. State
Department). This evolved into a successful British colony with the help of the Krio
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(returned slaves who had become somewhat assimilated into a European way of life).
The Krio originally came from all over Africa, but now shared English as a common
language, and Christianity as a common cultural point of reference. Needless to say the
return of the Krio generated conflict with the indigenous people of Sierra Leone
(Gascoigne 2001). From 1896 to 1951, Britain maintained a protectorate over Sierra
Leone without the consent of the indigenous inhabitants. The Sierra Leone TRC findings
state:
“The Commission finds that the Colonial power in Sierra Leone deliberately
created two nations in the same land, one in the colony and the other in the protectorate.
The impact of the separate development policies had far-reaching consequences,
particularly in the fields of education, access to resources and in the social and political
development of the two regions. The policies of the Colonial government led to the
preferential development of the Colony at the expense of the Protectorate” (Sierra Leone
TRC: Findings 2004, 6).
Although the differentiation between native groups did lead to conflict within the
country, ultimately Sierra Leone independence was achieved without violence. In 1951,
decolonization was worked into the constitution and by 1961 Sierra Leone became part of
the British commonwealth (Sierra Leone, U.S. State Department). In 1967, however, the
new democracy of Sierra Leone started its decline. The All Peoples Congress (APC) led
by Siaka Stevens won plurality in parliament and began a series of efforts to ensure that
he and his party had sole power through a repressive rule. Stevens went so far as to
amend the constitution so it would only acknowledge one party, the APC (Sierra Leone,
U.S. State Department). The government failed to recognize any opposition, thereby
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eliminating the possibility of democratic competition. Corruption increased in 1985,
when Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh was elected president after Stevens retired.
According to the Sierra Leone TRC findings: “By the end of the 1980s, Sierra Leone had
become a deeply fragmented country, marked by an almost total lack of national identity.
Notions of citizenship and patriotism had become meaningless concepts” (2004, 7). This
fragmentation and lack of government accountability established the backdrop for the
next ten years of civil war.
In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began attacks on the south-eastern
border of Sierra Leone to gain control of diamond mines in the region, while pushing the
Sierra Leone army back towards Freetown. In 1992, Capt Valentine Strasser initiated a
military coup which resulted in the exile of Momoh to Guinea; Strasser then established
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as ruling party of Sierra Leone. By
1995, the RUF had gained considerable ground, controlling most of the western portion
of Sierra Leone and moving in on Freetown. The NPRC hired mercenaries to drive back
these forces in 1995 and by the following year turned over power to a civilian
government, at which point Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a UN diplomat, won the presidency
(Sierra Leone, U.S. State Department). However, by 1997 Kabbah was thrown out of
office by a violent military coup, at which point, the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), led by Johnny Koroma, wrested control and invited members of the
RUF into the government. This was followed by wide scale human rights violations in
which RUF leader Foday Sankoh joined Koroma’s military government, and together
their supporters ravaged the country (Gascoigne 2001). Sankoh was able to take
advantage of the collapsed economic structure and recruit young people for the military
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(specifically child soldiers). Additionally, the diamond mining industry was able to
provide roughly $300 million of revenue each year for the rebel forces. As a result of the
failed government and economic system more than 40 percent of the country’s population
was dislocated, with many seeking asylum in surrounding countries (Pratt 1999, Report
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs).
The United Nations (UN) opposed Sankoh’s coup and instated sanctions on
military material imports while also prohibiting international travel by members of the
military. Dozens were killed during this time of AFRC and RUF conflict. In March
1998, the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) overthrew AFRC and reinstated President Kabbah. This movement
instigated much violence in Freetown, which led to what became known as “Operation
No Living Thing”. The “operation” consisted of murders, torture, and intentional
dismemberment of the civilian population. Rebel forces used women and children as
shields during their attacks, burned entire cities, and abducted 3,000 children (Pratt
1999). Finally the violence on all sides subsided enough for President Kabbah and RUF
leader Sankoh to sign the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7th 1999, which among other
provisions, established a shared government between Kabbah and Sankoh. This would
not, however, be the end of the violence. In 2000 RUF rebels took members of the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) hostage and killed anti-RUF
demonstrators. Sankoh and various members of RUF were arrested and removed from
government positions. In November 2000, a new peace agreement signed in Abuja in a
renewed effort for disarmament, but it was hindered by an attack on the RUF by Guinean
forces in response to RUF attacks in Guinea. Peace efforts were made for a third time in
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May of 2001, in which a second Abuja Agreement for peace was signed between the
government and rebel forces. It ultimately led to large scale disarmament and
demobilization of the rebels. On January 18th 2002, the ten year civil war was officially
declared over. By May of that year, President Kabbah was re-elected in a democratic
election with 70% of the vote. The RUF failed to hold a single seat. In the summer of
2002 the Sierra Leone TRC was established by the president and parliament (as per the
Lomé Peace Agreement), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SPSL) was instated by
the United Nations (USIP, Sierra Leone). In October 2004, the TRC publicly released its
final report.

Data Analysis:

South Africa
In this section I will conceptually disaggregate “reconciliation” into a series of
subcomponents, and will rank the level of achievement of each sub-component on a scale
from 1 to 3 (i.e. 1= low quality, 2= medium, 3= high)1. The following serves as a
reminder of South Africa’s TRC mandate so that we may keep in mind its ultimate goals
as we refer back to the operationalized definition of reconciliation. The Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 mandates the TRC “to provide for the
investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature,
causes and extent of gross violations of human rights” (Republic of South Africa 1995,
1). To achieve its mandate the TRC was divided into three committees: the Human

1

For an overview of all the sub-components of reconciliation, please refer back to Figure 2 (p.21). For a
discussion of scoring please see discussion on page 23.
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Rights Violations Committee (HRVC), the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee
(RRC), and the Amnesty Committee (AC).

Truth:
Truth is one of the two primary components of reconciliation. It is also a primary
goal of the TRC, as stated in its mandate to collect a complete, all encompassing truth
with contributions from all sides of the conflict. Collecting an accurate version of the
truth completely depends on the willingness of the people of South Africa to testify, and
the strength of their testimonies. However, it is important to look at the viewpoint of
both the victims and perpetrators in regards to the commission.

I)

Victim and Perpetrator Testimony
The Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) was mandated to hear

testimonies from victims of human rights violations and corroborate them through an
extensive database (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [4] 148). It was considered in
the best interest of a victim to testify to the HRVC not only for the psychological
benefits, but also so that their information could be transferred with recommendations to
the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC). Additionally, perpetrators named
by victims could be summoned to the commission to testify themselves and either be sent
to a prosecution mechanism, or appeal to the Amnesty Committee (AC).
The TRC in general was a very emotionally-charged atmosphere. Victims were
connected to their stories and shared them in extensive detail, drawing out the emotions
of the rest of the commission and audience. In one instance, during a particularly graphic
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and moving testimony from a mother who lost a son, Archbishop Tutu “put his own face
down on the table in front of him and wept uncontrollably” (Allen 2006, 352).
Commissioner Mary Burton stated in reference to public testimony, “the right to be heard
and acknowledged, with respect and empathy, did contribute to a process of healing in
many cases” (Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 6).
Furthermore, there was a clear incentive for the perpetrators to testify for the
commission. They could voluntarily approach the AC or be subpoenaed to the
commission if their name was tied to a crime by either a victim, witness, or other
perpetrator (Graybill 2002, 69). The AC was then mandated to determine whether the
perpetrator had shared his or her complete story in as much detail as possible and whether
his or her crimes were politically motivated. If these conditions were met the perpetrator
would be granted amnesty and begin the process of rehabilitation and reintegration into
the community. If they did not meet the requirements of the AC, perpetrators could be
prosecuted for their crimes in a court external to the TRC (Republic of South Africa
2003, vol. 1[5] 8).
There were religious underpinnings to the commission which resonated culturally
with many South Africans. Tutu constantly linked religious concepts to the notion of
Ubuntu and encouraged perpetrators to repent and victims to forgive. He argued that the
work of the TRC was not just about securing amnesty but instead was aimed at
demonstrating cooperation and group solidarity to promote harmony. A common theme
emerged akin to Ubuntu: that “group interests should prevail over individual rights” and
would ultimately lead to reconciliation for all. Wilson has criticized this approach and
the legitimacy of the “truth” gathered as a result of Ubuntu. He states that the
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“constitutional right of citizens to due justice, to pursue civil claims against perpetrators,
is taken away by amnesty laws…this was justified in terms of a uniquely African form of
compassion, or Ubuntu. By combining human rights and Ubuntu, human rights come to
express compromised justice” (Wilson 2001, 11).
On account of the South African TRC in working directly with the prosecution
mechanism, if a complete truth is not obtained by the AC, the restorative justice option
yields to retributive justice, so a victim is not deprived of justice. The victim’s and
perpetrator’s perception of the TRC rests on the commission’s ability to gather
testimonies and to engage both victims and perpetrators in order to obtain the full story.
It was clear that both victims and perpetrators had a strong incentive to come to the
commission and testify, and to share their experiences over the prior three decades of
conflict. My overall rating for the quality of victim and perpetrator testimony then is
high, i.e. 3 on a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 3 (high). [Score: 3]

II)

Scope and Comprehensiveness of Information
One important aspect in determining whether the TRC achieved a high level of

truth to contribute to reconciliation is whether or not the people of South Africa are
satisfied with it. Ultimately, the people have to accept that the truth gathered is complete
and impartial in order for it to be effective. Academic James L. Gibson, conducted
extensive public opinion surveys on various aspects of South Africa’s TRC. He included
members of the four major racial groups in South Africa in the interview pool (African,
White, Coloured, and Asian Origin), and provided surveys in numerous different
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languages in order to make them accessible to all. Ultimately he collected 3727
completed interviews (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 2).
Participants were asked to rate their “satisfaction with specific aspects of the
performance of the truth and reconciliation commission”. The following table
graphically represents Gibson’s findings.
Table 1:
Satisfaction with Specific Aspects of the Performance of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
Excellent
Job

Pretty
Good Job

Pretty
Bad Job

Poor Job

Don’t
Know

N

African

46.2

38.9

5.3

2.1

7.6

2000

White

3.6

30.9

28.0

19.6

17.9

986

Coloured

13.6

34.5

9.5

4.8

37.6

484

Asian Origin

18.8

53.1

10.6

5.7

11.8

245

Providing true and unbiased
account of country’s history

Percentages (Totaling to 100%)
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 22)
Gibson received a fairly positive response from the majority of those who took
the survey, especially within the black South African group (i.e. the “African” in the table
above) which comprises the vast majority of the population (78%). The majority
believed the TRC did either a “pretty good job” or “excellent job” gathering a “true and
unbiased account of the country’s history” (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 2).
A second significant contributing factor in the assessment of truth is the provision
of conditional amnesty, and its ability to draw people into participating in the TRC. The
Commission received 21,000 statements from alleged victims and 7,124 from individuals
pursuing amnesty (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 2 [1] 2). Over “50 public
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hearings were held, spanning a total of 244 days”, comprised of what the commission
deemed representative cases (Hamber and Kibble 2007, 12). Because of the sheer
volume of statements, there was not sufficient time for all contributors to be heard. All of
these statements were processed and turned over to the RRC with recommendations.
Cases that both demonstrated a variety of human rights violations and were representative
of a generalized pattern of abuse (about 10% of the total) were chosen for public
testimony (Hamber and Kibble 2007, 12).
Desmond Tutu, in the forward of the final report, stated that there was in fact
public displeasure when a case in prosecution was dismissed because of reasonable
doubt, which often resulted from a lack of witnesses. By contrast, in the TRC he said
“Amnesty applicants often confessed to more gruesome crimes… yet their assumption of
responsibility, and the sense that at least people were getting some measure of truth from
the process, resulted in much less anger” (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [1] 1).
The provision of conditional amnesty effectively drew out information and required
people to take responsibility for their actions who otherwise may have attempted to
maintain their innocence in a court setting.
Additionally, the commission had the power to subpoena witnesses, and the right
to search and seizure, which gave them the authority to investigate cases thoroughly.
This was a novel concept for TRCs (Hamber and Kibble 2007, 14). It ensured that the
information gathered was in fact the truth, as it could be measured against other’s
testimony. As a result, the AC had the strength to extract meaningful testimonies from
those who may have been reluctant to share.
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Unfortunately, the TRC was underutilized by the white community. Even if many
of them simply benefited passively from apartheid, testifying to the commission as a
witness could have provided a vehicle for expressing an apology and could have
benefited the overall process of reconciliation.
Ultimately, there was an extensive effort from the commission, victims,
perpetrators, and witnesses in general to collaborate and piece together what is largely
perceived to be an accurate picture of the conflict and resulting human rights violations.
Thereby, my overall rating for the quality of the scope and comprehensiveness of
information is medium-high. [Score: 2.5]

III)

Access v. restriction to commission
Because of the geographic size of South Africa and in the interest of facilitating

easy access, the commission decided to decentralize. It created its primary office in Cape
Town with four regional offices in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, and East London,
and a sub regional office in Bloemfontein (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [6] 6).
The committee members and commissioners than made a proactive attempt to
communicate with members of the surrounding communities. Additionally, they held
community hearings and information sessions in which they would travel to a particular
community, which helped to lend context to testimonies given by victims, perpetrators
and occasional experts (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [6] 16b). Nevertheless, the
commission deemed the access to the commission insufficient and extended its efforts to
ensure the rural populations were being equally represented. The TRC assigned a
“community liaison officer” to each region to coordinate efforts with local partner
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organizations in order to train statement-takers who would have access to these
communities and make sure their voices were heard. “The project increased the number
of statements taken by the Commission by almost 50 per cent” (Republic of South Africa
2003, vol. 1 [6] 16c).
The commission continually expanded its availability until they could ensure the
TRC was accessible to all. Hence, I rate access to the commission as being high.
[Score: 3]

IV)

Publicity and awareness
The TRC would have been of little use if the population of South Africa were

unaware of its existence and purpose. This is why the country embraced an educational
campaign with a slogan of “revealing is healing” to demonstrate the ultimate goal: that
truth leads to reconciliation. The commission took initiatives to work with local media,
NGOs, and think-tanks to distribute informational booklets to the public and present
resources through television, radio, and newspapers (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol.
1 [9] 31-32). The state and the TRC also emphasized the concept of Ubuntu, in an effort
to make a cultural connection with the people.
According to Gibson’s study, the proportion of the population “expressing little or
no awareness of the TRC activities” was as follows:

41

Table 2:
“Percent Expressing Little or No Awareness of the TRC Activities
African
White
Colored
Asian origin

11%
12%
33%
9%

(Gibson 2004, 92)
It is clear that advertising campaigns were effective in educating the public, especially in
the many rural areas of South Africa. It is worth mentioning that there was a positive
correlation between awareness of the TRC and confidence in the TRC, which also held
true with the Colored South Africans (who had the least awareness of the TRC)—
meaning that as they became aware of the commission, they also tended to be more
confident in its actions (Gibson 2004, 92).
During the TRC, the South African Broadcast Company aired live coverage of the
public hearings in addition to a weekly program which was shown every Sunday from
April 1996 to March 1998 and provided a summary of the week’s events (Gibson 2006,
416). This program consistently had one of the highest popularity ratings on television;
however, even more people became aware of the TRC’s activities through extensive
radio exposure. Additionally, the TRC’s decision to hold public hearings in rural
communities further increased awareness and educated the people on their option to
testify.
The final report of the TRC and the process more generally assigned blame to all
parties regardless of whether or not they were presently in a position of power.
Additionally, all had an incentive to testify to the commission, which made itself widely
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available. My assessment of the quality of publicity and public awareness is thus high.
[Score: 3]
I calculate the average of all the sub-components of truth to be: 2.875; which
signifies a high level of truth gathered.

Restorative Justice:
Restorative justice is the second major sub-component of reconciliation. The
RRC and AC both contributed significantly to achieving restorative justice in South
Africa. The AC had the ability to actually investigate crimes and subpoena witnesses in
order to bring justice to victims, and the RRC was mandated to develop recommendations
to the government in terms of rehabilitation and reparations for victims. The following is
a discussion of the constitutive elements of restorative justice, each of which I rate for
overall quality in the South Africa case.

I)

Rehabilitation
a)

Implementation of mechanism

Guy Lamb of the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town
researched the reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. He found that 77% of
respondents did not have the equivalent of a high school diploma, which greatly restricted
their employment options especially--since 80% were less than 50 years of age and have
been an asset to the work force (Lamb 2003, 1-2). Many of the respondents depended on
family members for basic necessities and support, and about a third said they suffered
from psychological problems. Lamb reported informal support structures existing among
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social networks of ex-combatants, who discussed job opportunities and strategy as well
as political progress; 83% of ex-combatants responded that they did belong to a
community (2003, 3). Though an internal support group and community acceptance are
undoubtedly important to overall well-being, the inability of ex-combatants to be
economically self-sufficient was draining for those they depended upon as well as for
their communities. “Many former combatants have been unsuccessful in effectively
reintegrating into civilian society and consequently further targeted support for these
individuals is required” (Lamb 2003, 4). This does not necessarily involve government
providing certain amenities to ex-combatants, but giving them the skills to acquire
necessities themselves.
In terms of victims, there is a very slow process toward obtaining physical and
mental health assistance although it was recommended by the TRC. “There has been
some movement in recent years towards providing services and benefits through the
programs of various government departments. However to date these have been illcoordinated and without a monitoring function in place it is impossible to assess actual
impact” (University of Witwatersrand 2010, Traces of Truth).
South Africa does need formalized rehabilitation programs specific to adult
victims of apartheid. The country does make a visible effort to make these amenities
available to children; there are specific programs aimed at demobilization, reinsertion and
reintegration of child soldiers, for example, one of which is funded by the World Bank.
Additional resources are contributed by UN agencies such as United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF). It appears the process of the TRC has helped to reintegrate some ex-
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combatants, but more targeted assistance would be beneficial. My overall rating for
quality of the implementation mechanisms for rehabilitation is thus low. [Score: 1.5]

II)

Guarantee of non repetition
a)

Memorial efforts

The final report of South Africa’s TRC refers to memorials as a form of “public
official acknowledgement”. The commission viewed a memorial as a form of symbolic
reparations, which “are also wider in scope or more holistic than those customarily
awarded as damages in successful civil claims” (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1
[5] 95). In this way, the reparations are more lasting and will have intergenerational
implications. There were ceremonial aspects to the TRC which served to memorialize
those who were lost over the preceding decades of conflict. They typically involved
prayer and other religious acts which many in attendance could internalize, in addition to
the lighting of a memorial candle, and the singing of hymns and songs at each hearing
(Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 5 [1] 10).
There are also numerous government-initiated permanent memorials in the
process of being created, some of which include the Women’s Monument to recognize
the involvement and active effort of women against apartheid. The Nelson Mandela
Museum opened in 2000 and is comprised of a museum, a youth center, and a visitor’s
center. In 1998 the Ncome Monument and Wall of Remembrance were established with
a museum opening the following year, to honor Zulu involvement. Additionally, the
government took the TRC recommendation to pursue a Freedom Park. This project is
expected to be completed in 2010 and honors the anti-apartheid movement and those who
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fought for freedom and equality in South Africa. The park was “hailed by President
Thabo Mbeki as ‘…the fulcrum of our vision to heal and reconcile our nation…’” and
will reshape the skyline of the capital city Pretoria (Lomholt and Welch 2008).
There is also a War Graves Project in progress which aims to “archive
photographs of every single South African and Rhodesian war grave from the second
Anglo-Boer War, Bambatha Rebellion, WW1, Rand Revolt, WW2, Korea, Freedom
Struggle, Angola-Border War, Non World War and Police to present day” (War Graves
Project 2010). These photos will eventually contribute to a physical memorial as well as
one online, so that those who cannot travel to the grave sites of their loved ones may still
feel connected, and receive closure (McLean 2010).
These are but a few of the memorials, monuments, and government facilities
created to honor those who were lost during the past decades of violence, as well as to
acknowledge the violations of the past and to serve as a guarantee of non repetition. My
overall assessment of the quality of war memorials is thus high. [Score: 3]

b)

Government accountability for reform

Public opinion surveys are one method researchers can employ to assess whether
the government is taking adequate precautions to ensure past human rights violations are
not repeated and that the reform promised is achieved. Gibson’s survey included
questions on respondents’ perceptions of government success in “ensuring that human
rights abuses won’t happen again” (2001, 22). The results are described below:
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Table 3:
Excellent
Job

Pretty
Good Job

Pretty
Bad Job

Poor Job

Don’t
Know

N

African

48.6

36.4

4.5

1.9

8.7

1999

White

6.2

32.1

21.7

18.0

22.1

983

Coloured

18.3

28.2

6.8

8.0

38.7

486

Asian Origin

18.9

46.7

11.1

7.0

16.4

244

Ensuring that human rights
abuses won’t happen again

Percentages (Totaling to 100 %)
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 22)
Gibson received mixed reviews here, depending upon the ethnicity of the
respondent, though across the board the majority of responses fell into the “Pretty
Good/Excellent Job” category (2001, 22). With coloured people responding “Don’t
Know” in relatively high numbers (38.7) (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 22).
A first step in fostering government accountability is the decision to provide
conditional amnesty for all parties. No group was exempt from being subpoenaed to the
TRC to serve as a witness. Once subpoenaed, an individual could apply for amnesty or
risk being sent to a prosecution mechanism if he or she was tied to a politically motivated
crime.
The running of a fair, democratic election is also a demonstration of government
commitment to reform, and 1994 marked the first, universal adult suffrage, post apartheid
election. Nelson Mandela achieved an easy victory with an overwhelming 62% of the
general vote. Frederik Willem deKlerk who was the incumbent, spoke in reference to the
election, characterizing it as “the realization of the vision I spelled out in Parliament on 2
February 1990” (de Klerk 1999, 334). DeKlerk expressed that he simply wanted to attain
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a one-third vote because of the system of proportional representation in South Africa, but
was not disappointed with his 20% (1999, 334). He said it was “a critical moment for
many ANC supporters. Quite a number of them never fully believed that we would really
hand over power when the moment arrived” (de Klerk 1999, 334). The ability for South
Africa to successfully hold democratic elections and honor the results reflected a high
level of government accountability. [Score: 2.5]
i)

State apology

While exploring South African perception of government accountability, Gibson
asked his respondents if they supported “government compensation in the form of public
apologies to the victims” (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 28). The responses were
overwhelmingly positive, as indicated below:
Table 4:
The Role of the Government in Compensating Victims
Government Compensation in
the form of....
Public Apologies to the
Victims
African
White
Coloured
Asian Origin

Support
Doing

86.2
73.9
66.5
90.6

Do Not Support

Don’t Know

11.5
2.3
19.6
6.5
13.0
20.6
8.2
1.2
Percentages (Totaling to 100 %)

N

2004
988
486
245

(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 28)

On August 21, 1996, during his testimony to the TRC, the apartheid-era president
of South Africa and leader of the National Party (NP), Frederik Willem de Klerk, made a
formal apology for the actions resulting in “pain and suffering caused by former policies
of the National Party” (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 185). He
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acknowledged that a “prime purpose of the truth and reconciliation process is to learn
from the experiences of the past and to ensure that we never again repeat the same
mistakes” (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 185). He specified that no group
could solely be blamed for the decades of human rights abuses, nor could any individual
escape guilt whether he or she was actively involved or passively benefited. Likewise, no
group could take full credit for ending apartheid and bringing the country to peace.
Overall, deKlerk emphasized that it is important to recognize the process of
reconciliation as a group process such that there is no way for a country to move forward
if people do not take responsibility for the past and get involved in bettering the future.
Thabo Mbeki, leader of the ANC and the post-apartheid president of South Africa
(1999-2008) offered a public apology which very much paralleled that of de Klerk. He
stated that “the ANC highly regrets the excesses that occurred” during the battle against
apartheid (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 186). He then acknowledged the
work of the TRC and stated, “we appreciate the fact that the Commission is pursuing its
work without fear or favor” (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 187).
It is significant that both the last apartheid-era president and a post-apartheid
president, apologized on behalf of their respective organizations. Both showed respect
for and encouraged participation in the TRC. This sets an example for the rest of the
country to follow. Hence I rate the quality of public apology as high. [Score: 3]
Averaging all sub-components of the category, I assign an overall score for the
guarantee of non-repetition a 2.83.
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III)

Restitution
In the South African TRC, restitution was managed through the RRC. While the

AC had active powers and legal rights, the RRC could only listen to testimony and go
through statements passed over by the HRVC in order to make recommendations to the
government. The government, in turn, was free to take or disregard such
recommendations. However, as a result of the conditional amnesty provision there was
the added aspect: if a perpetrator did not testify adequately under the guidelines of the
AC, she or he could be sent to a prosecution mechanism. Though South Africa’s TRC
focused on Ubuntu, encompassing peace and forgiveness as a community, the possibility
of prosecution for those who did not conform offered an additional form of restitution to
a victim.

a)

Compensation
i)

Monetary/Benefits

The RRC did not have any power to actually offer reparations but only to make
recommendations to the government. There was a “President’s Fund” which was
comprised of contributions from parliament and private donations which could be used to
fund reparations (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [5] 93).
One especially complicated aspect of compensation dealt with the 1994 Land
reform program, which sought to “restore land to individuals and communities who can
prove they were dispossessed by apartheid policy and practices since the 1913 Land Act”
(Andrew 2006, 1). Obviously, restoration of land was impeded by the private owners
who had already settled on the land. There are many symbolic methods of compensation

50

but they mean little when a person believes he or she is rightfully entitled to a piece of
land which was unfairly taken away. When it is unfeasible to give the land back to its
original owners, it then becomes an issue of negotiating value in order to move forward
with monetary restitution. In the South African case, negotiations over land value
resulted in a long, drawn-out process with few conclusions. Andrew has argued that
“This political framework does not offer a democratic solution to the socially embedded
land question. It seems abundantly clear that restitution cannot ‘close this painful chapter
of history’” (2006, 14).
Gibson’s survey included questions on public perceptions of government
compensation. The responses are summarized as follows:
Table 5:
Satisfaction with Specific Aspects of the Performance of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
Excellent
Job

Pretty
Good Job

Pretty
Bad Job

Poor Job

Don’t
Know

N

African

43.0

30.5

9.5

7.2

9.8

2002

White

4.5

25.4

26.3

15.9

27.9

984

Coloured

10.9

22.8

11.1

11.5

43.6

486

Asian Origin

15.9

40.8

13.9

14.3

15.1

245

Awarding compensation to
victims

Percentages (Totaling to 100 %)
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 21)
Responses vary by ethnicity, without a general consensus across the board:
although the largest response group “African” did have overwhelmingly positive
feedback, whites were far less convinced of the TRC’s success and coloured people
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overwhelmingly responded they “Don’t Know” how to rate the TRC’s success (Gibson
and Macdonald 2001, 21).
In 2003, President Mbeki announced that 22,000 victims of apartheid who
testified to the TRC would receive 30,000 rand (about US $3,800) worth of reparations
(Peta 2003). This was a severe disappointment to the victims. Even though it was
presented as a symbolic move by the government, it was insufficient in providing real
economic assistance to those who had suffered so much. Since 2003, the South African
government has moved away from money as compensation to an emphasis on community
restitution and symbolic reparation (Sacco and Hoffman 2004, 9). As I have argued
previously, a monetary award can never truly provide compensation for the human rights
violations that have occurred but instead serves as a symbolic apology that contributes to
the guarantee of non repetition. Public opinion data reveals that the people of South
Africa for the most part have accepted these modest sums as satisfactory compensation
from the government. In this way the South African government has acknowledged the
injustices, sought out the victims, and taken steps toward compensation. Yet regardless
of the symbolic importance of reparations, many continue to call attention to “the vast
inequality between rich and poor, which still is mostly determined by race” (Graybill
2002, 357). My assessment of the overall quality of the monetary component of the
TRC’s work is mixed. [Score: 2]
ii)

Community Service

There were individual instances of perpetrators taking it upon themselves to pay
some sort of restitution for their wrongdoings. For example, Eugene de Kock, formerly
of the South African Police, donated the royalties from his autobiography to a trust fund
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established for apartheid victims. Another perpetrator helped clear land mines and
counted it as a symbolic penance, while yet another considered risking his life to turn
crucial information over to the commission as his form of restitution (Hamber and Kibble
2007, 21-22). However, these instances are not representative of the lager population.
The National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders (Nicro)
works with youth to promote restorative justice and reintegration through community
service, education, and therapy programs. Yet Graybill states that even the
commissioners represented in her article, Alex Boraine and Mary Burton, “are critical of
the government's limited response to the Commission's recommendations for substantial
reparations” (Graybill 2002, 357). Monetary reparations cannot hope to compensate for
what a person has lost as a result of human rights violations, although restorative justice
(such as in the form of community service) carries significant symbolic weight. South
Africa seems to lack organized community service programs open to adults, despite the
fact that such programs could be extremely beneficial for perpetrators as well as victims.
Overall South Africa’s TRC does not provide a formal opportunity for community
service resulting in a low score. [Score: 1]
Given the mixed record of South Africa’s TRC in the various sub-components of
restitution, the average score is 1.5.
The overall score I assign for Restorative Justice as a composite of rehabilitation,
the guarantee of non-repetition is 1.94 (i.e. a medium level of restorative justice).
Therefore, the overall Reconciliation score resulting from the average of truth and
restorative justice, is 2.41 which signifies a medium-high level of reconciliation
ultimately achieved in South Africa. (Truth-2.875, Restorative Justice- 1.94)
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Sierra Leone
Below, I reiterate the mandate of the Sierra Leone TRC as laid out in the Lomé
Peace Agreement. It is important to keep the ultimate goals of the commission in the
forefront as I assess the TRC’s overall success in achieving reconciliation. The Sierra
Leonean TRC mandate states:
“The object for which the Commission is established is to create an
impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and
international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra
Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the
Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of
the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a
repetition of the violations and abuses suffered” (part 3 (6) 1).

Truth:
Developing a comprehensive historical record depends upon having valid,
comprehensive contributions from the victims, witnesses, and perpetrators. Before I
assess the scope and comprehensiveness of the information gathered, it is important to be
aware of the mindset of the victims and perpetrators in Sierra Leone with regard to the
commission.
I)

Victim and Perpetrator Testimony
It is widely accepted that the perpetrators feared the TRC primarily because of its

proximity to the Special Court for Sierra Leone2. Perpetrators did not trust that the TRC
would not reveal information to the Special Court which would have led to their
subsequent prosecution. Their doubts were reinforced by the fact that the Commission
and the Court sat practically adjacent to each other in Freetown and the officials were
2

The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United
Nations and is mandated to try “those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30
November 1996” (The Special Court for Sierra Leone 2010, about).
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frequently seen together. There was actually a rumor that there was an underground
tunnel connecting the two (Kelsall 2005, 381). Rosalind Shaw, who wrote a special
report on the Sierra Leone TRC for the United States Institute of Peace, reported: “In
every district in which I conducted research during the TRC hearings in 2003 (Port Loko,
Bombali, Kambia, Tonkolili, and Moyamba), ex-combatants were almost universally
fearful of the TRC” (2005, 4). This fear was so pronounced that perpetrators actually
attempted to run out the statement takers upon their arrival, or went into hiding
themselves. Shaw states, “Ex-combatant’s participation was low in all of the district
hearings I attended, and one of the district hearings (Port Loko) was unable to obtain any
ex-combatant testimonies at all” (2005, 4). By virtue of the government providing
blanket amnesty, ex-combatants made a personal choice as to whether or not they wanted
to testify. Various factors influenced their decision to do so or not: a discomfort with the
situation, distrust of the commission, dismissal of accountability, or general disinclination
to testify.
Victims were hesitant to embrace the commission and opted instead for a “forgive
and forget” mentality for two reasons. First, putting the past behind them fell within the
norms of their culture better than healing through recanting violations. “People had been
talking about the violence when the violence was present, but once it stopped, healing
took place through practices of social forgetting” (Shaw 2005, 9). Victims and Sierra
Leonean society more generally did not embrace the philosophy that talking about the
events of the last ten years and revealing a truth would ultimately lead to healing. Many
who did testify seemed to do so in an unemotional state. During Kelsall’s field research,
he found the testimonies lacked detail, vividness, and an emotional connection (2005,
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369). One statement taker to whom he expressed these concerns stated: “They find it
hard to say everything about those things, so they are just circling around the truth”
(Kelsall 2005, 369). Secondly, victims and witnesses feared retaliation by perpetrators,
since many perpetrators served in the government or the new Sierra Leonean army due to
the provision of blanket amnesty (Shaw 2005, 5). It became apparent when perpetrators
did testify that the audience looked to them to demonstrate a “cool heart” (Shaw 2005,
11). This characteristic of the perpetrator conveyed a transformation and goal to move
forward peacefully. It seemed the public was more concerned with ensuring that the excombatants in their communities did not seek retaliation than with creating the basis for
actual accountability. Hence, the victim’s and perpetrator’s perceptions of the
commission were not conducive to gathering a meaningful truth. Thus, my overall score
for truth is low. [Score: 1]

II)

Scope and Comprehensiveness of Information
The victim’s and perpetrator’s perceptions of the TRC had a direct influence on

the scope and comprehensiveness of information the commission was able to gather.
What the commission introduced as verbal remembering (i.e. truth-telling with the intent
of promoting healing and reconciliation) was not unanimously accepted among the Sierra
Leonean population. Drawing on the findings of her ethnographic study, Shaw states,
“People in the northern Sierra Leonean communities in which I conducted research
discussed the war within their families and inside their houses, but often reminded each
other not to ‘pull it outside’” (2005, 9). It is crucial when approaching such a sensitive
subject as human rights violations, to align as much as possible and build upon the
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philosophy of the local communities (Shaw 2005, 12). In South Africa, for instance,
there was a strong emphasis placed on exposing the truth and forgiving, which paralleled
local religious beliefs. In Sierra Leone, it was not so simple, and local beliefs were
arguably not sufficiently integrated into the TRC. In northern Sierra Leone, for example,
some communities embraced the idea of “social forgetting”, choosing not to talk about
the violence at all for fear it would lead to further aggression (Shaw 2005, 2). Some
areas went so far as to collectively agree not to testify before the commission.
As a result of centuries of reoccurring conflict in Sierra Leone, extending far
beyond the ten year civil war, communities developed their own approaches to
reconciliation in order to reintegrate perpetrators and move forward. Some communities
which had a history of self-initiated reconciliation gave priority to these efforts over those
which were state initiated and unfamiliar. In some cases, the TRC actively disrupted
traditional practices of reconciliation at the community level, acting as an obstacle with
potentially harmful consequences (Shaw 2005, 8-9).
Of the perpetrators who did testify, according to Kelsall’s observations, many did
not take responsibility for their actions, often denying any participation (2005, 372).
They apologized to the community, once pressured by the commissioners, for associating
with groups which were responsible for human rights violations; but this apology meant
little when none took individual responsibility. In one interaction between a perpetrator
and Bishop Kamara, the witness stated: “I am asking the people of this community to
forgive me for whatever atrocities I have done. Because we are RUF and we in the RUF
did a lot of atrocities in this country” (Kelsall 2005, 373).
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Frustrated upon interviewing a perpetrator known to have committed violations to
which he would not admit, one commissioner stated that the community knew of these
atrocities and that “if you do not come out to publicly declare what you have done and
ask for forgiveness for what you have done, you are not likely to get forgiveness”
(Kelsall 2005, 373). As a result of the blanket amnesty provision this is essentially the
worst the commission could threaten: that a perpetrator would not receive forgiveness.
Hence, there was little concrete incentive for perpetrators to publicly unveil all of their
wrongdoings.
Although it was forbidden by the TRC for the audience to show disapproval with
a testimony, the negative reactions to the perpetrators were evident. A district
representative of the People’s Party stated to Kelsall, “We are not happy! They have not
told the truth. They are lying!” (2005, 377). Other members of the community
threatened to drive them out if they did not admit guilt and give an honest apology. By
the end of the testimonies, it seemed too many observers unlikely that a lasting
reconciliation could be achieved (Kelsall 2005, 377).
The mandate of the TRC included collecting an unbiased, complete truth, and
addressing impunity in order to advance a peaceful reconciliation process. I would argue
that the decision of certain groups around the country (particularly a geographic area such
as northern Sierra Leone) not to testify, or at least not revealing the complete truth,
resulted is an incomplete truth as all groups were not involved. This incomplete
historical record came at the expense of addressing impunity which in turn undercut the
process toward reconciliation. The limited truth gathered from victims and witnesses in
conjunction with a lack of individual responsibility on the part of the perpetrators who
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did testify, resulted in a low level of scope and comprehensiveness of information.
[Score: 1]

III)

Access v. restriction to commission
The TRC was in Freetown for two weeks and thereafter traveled to twelve

different locations around Sierra Leone. In an effort to make the commission accessible
it was willing to transport witnesses to the venue so that transportation would not be an
obstacle. Bishop Humper stated to one witness early on, “Tell your brothers and sisters
not to be afraid to come and testify because even in the provinces transportation will be
made available for witnesses” (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 3, 38). There were 7,706
statements taken, though not all who were interviewed participated in hearings or gave
testimony out of either personal choice, or in the interest of time. The commission
attempted to hear testimony from a representative portion of the population and to
publicize a wide variety of crimes (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 1, 33). There was some
frustration by those who would have liked to, but were not given the opportunity to
publicly testify. Their truth was still gathered, just not in a public hearing as those were
reserved for the worst crimes, and those which covered a representative spectrum of
crimes. This did limit the number of people actually able to talk about their experiences
in public, but all of the testimonies were still gathered, and the choice to proceed in this
way was made by the TRC in an effort to tell a complete story. As a result I rate the
access to the commission as high. [Score: 3]
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IV)

Publicity and awareness
Prior to the start of the TRC, workshops in Freetown and provincial towns

employed “sensitization material” in order to raise awareness of the coming commission,
its purpose and goals (Shaw 2005, 8). Advertising consisted of print and images to
increase understanding. “Leaflets included drawings of burning villages, followed by
drawings of ex-combatants testifying in front of stern civilians” with sayings meant to
promote the TRC to the public. Sayings included “Truth hurts, but war hurts more” and
“Truth today! Peaceful Sierra Leone Tomorrow” which advocated for the power of truth
over social forgetting (Shaw 2005, 8).
Publicity was comprised of radio, television, and print media (Sierra Leone TRC
Ap.3, 147). During the commission there was a 45 minute summary of the day’s events
on television each night. Sesay’s study asked respondents “whether they were aware of
the existence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up at the end of the civil
war” (2007, 34) The respondents consisted of elites, public, traditional leaders, and
religious leaders. In total, 93.8% responded “yes” they were aware of the commission,
with the remaining 6.2% responding “no” (Sesay 2007, 34). It is important to note
however, that the study was focused around Freetown which also received a
disproportionate amount of the TRC publicity. “The TRC would have been differently
received had it not been more explicitly framed as a process that would enable people to
put the past behind them” (Shaw 2005, 12). The inability of the commission to develop a
philosophy that would resonate with the community was detrimental to the revelation of
truth. However, the TRC’s message did reach most of the people of Sierra Leone,
particularly those closer to Freetown. Though publicity could have extended further and
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been more personalized to the people of Sierra Leone, it is true that almost everyone was,
at minimum, aware of the commission. Thus, my overall rating for publicity and
awareness of the commission is moderate. [Score: 2]
I calculated the average of the sub-components of truth to be 1.75 which signifies
a medium/ medium-low level of truth gathered.

Restorative Justice:
The Lomé Peace Agreement promised “appropriations for public education,
public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war
victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Government of the
Republic of Sierra Leone, and Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 1999, (7) 6).
The following are a series of related factors.

I)

Rehabilitation
a)

Implementation of mechanism

At the time the statements of victims were taken by the commission, 67% “had
not received medical attention or counseling following the abuses” (Final Report Ap. 3,
38). In the following years there were other rehabilitation projects built for both victims
and ex-combatants that were created with the help of NGO’s and intergovernmental
organizations. Some of these include mechanisms especially focused on the
rehabilitation and reintegration of child-soldiers into their communities. For instance the
Child Advocacy and Rehabilitation (CAR) program run by the Sierra Leone Red Cross
Society (SLRCS) has a number of centers around Sierra Leone. The program focuses on
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educating the children, teaching them life and occupational skills and giving them a
community which offers support. Roughly 2,400 children had enrolled by 2005 (Clifford
2006, 1). The SLRC also seeks to inform communities about the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) as well as to offer educational support services such as
information on how to obtain employment, agricultural strategies, and sanitation (Clifford
2006, 3). The Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project was started during
the peace process at the end of the war. “The project sought to contribute to social
stability and facilitate the return of displaced and refugee populations by investing at the
earliest possible moment in the rehabilitation of destroyed villages” (Sierra Leone:
Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (P040649) 2003, 1). The project
boasts returning 220,000 displaced people to their communities of choice, and
implementing 269 projects in “agriculture, community infrastructure, education, health,
micro-enterprise promotion and reintegration and others” (Sierra Leone: Community
Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (P040649) 2003, 1). Among many other
contributions, this project helped 84 schools and 28 health centers return to operation
(Sierra Leone: Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (P040649) 2003, 1).
Contributors included the International Development Association (IDA), the African
Development Bank, and the Sierra Leonean government.
The Rehabilitation of Basic Education program, for which the Sierra Leonean
government borrowed money from the World Bank for a project from 2003 to 2009, was
aimed at preventing conflict and rebuilding the education system (Sierra Leone:
Rehabilitation of Basic Education 2003). This was a primary concern of the people who
testified in the TRC.
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There does appear to be a concerted effort on the part of the government to offer
rehabilitation mechanisms to the people of Sierra Leone. For the most part, the projects
are based on offering support and teaching so that the people can be more self sufficient.
There is a joint international effort to provide sufficient resources and therapy to the
people of Sierra Leone. Overall I assess the implementation of rehabilitation
mechanisms in Sierra Leone to be high. [Score: 3]

II)

Guarantee of non repetition
a)

Memorial efforts

The Sierra Leone TRC’s final report states that: “Insofar as memorials bring
people together, such public spaces may promote reconciliation between enemies” (Sierra
Leone TRC Ap. 4, 5). Memorials spark a dialogue about the issues of the past and tie
them to the present. They serve as a constant reminder of the violations of the past, so
that they may be guarded against going forward. Memorials also offer symbolic
reparations to the victims by not discounting their suffering.
The discussions about creating a memorial included ideas from people on all sides
of the conflict. The desire and effort to make the memorial accessible to everyone marked
a very forward-looking moment of unification; giving the people of Sierra Leone a
common goal. Considerable research went into the creation of memorials in Sierra
Leone. The people of Sierra Leone expressed an interest in memorials built around the
concept of hope and not forever focusing on a negative time in history (Sierra Leone
TRC Ap. 4, 7). The commission cites a traditional practice in Sierra Leone to bury the
dead outside of the town and simply bring back a stone from the burial site to keep in
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their home to show that the lost loved one will not be forgotten (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 4,
7).
The final report notes that high levels of illiteracy in the country have made it
necessary to design memorials so that they are accessible to everyone. Options include
visual art, as well as theater. One idea for a memorial which takes the previous concerns
into account was presented by the perpetrators. It consists of a cement wall in a public
place into which perpetrators would leave imprints of their hands symbolizing their
promise to “never use these hands again to pick up a weapon and strike a fellow human
being” (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 4, 8). It has yet to be created but discussion is underway
in a forum involving all of the stakeholders, which, in itself, will contribute to the process
of reconciliation.
Another method of recognizing those who were lost, acknowledging wrongdoing
on all sides, and moving forward as a community, is through ceremony. At the close of
the commission there was a reconciliation ceremony which “had a remarkable impact on
the hearings, transforming the atmosphere from one of virtual crisis and farce, to one of
emotional release and reconciliation” (Kelsall 2005, 378). The perpetrators were given
another opportunity to apologize which they again did on behalf of their respective
political factions, but there appeared to be more emotion involved which pleased the
audience.
Between the building of permanent memorial efforts, the process of collectively
deciding on them as well as ceremonial events which fit into the cultural norms of Sierra
Leone, the people of Sierra Leone were able to recognize the past, which directly
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promotes non-repetition. As a result, my assessment of the memorial efforts is thus high.
[Score: 3]
b)

Government accountability for reform

The Sierra Leone TRC looked to the South African TRC for guidance, and
replicated the South African commission’s use of information gathered to help the
victims find their loved ones and give them a decent burial (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 4, 4).
Though the TRC did well in recognizing the past as depicted above, through
memorials, the provision of blanket amnesty meant there was little legal accountability
for individual ex-combatants. Many chose not to testify at all, and really had no
incentive to do so without an internal drive and trust in the commission. They were also
allowed to continue working in the government, as many choose to do today (Shaw 2005,
5).
In a survey delivered by the Campaign for Good Governance in Sierra Leone,
participants were asked their opinion of:
Table 6:
“Whether the government is accountable”
Yes
54.6%

No
13.1%

Unsure
32.3%

[The quality of] “The government’s fight against corruption”
Very high
23,1%

High
25%

Average
35.4%

Low
13%

Very low
3.1%

[The quality of] “The government’s effort to maintain peace and reconciliation”
Very high
11.5%

High
26.6%

Average
39.6%

Low
16.9%

Very low
5.4%
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[The quality of] “General security situation”
Improved
9.6%

High
31.5%

Average
40.4%

Low
12.7%

Very low
5.8%

(Lawrence 2009, 6-8).
Although the provision of unconditional amnesty does not allow the government
to hold perpetrators (including those of the government) accountable for human rights
violations, the public does seem to perceive an effort on the part of the government to
pursue reform. Each of the above questions received a majority of “average” or “high”
responses, conveying that people have faith in the government to improve their living
situations. Consequently, my overall assessment for government accountability for
reform in Sierra Leone is medium-high. [Score: 2.5]

i)

State apology

An official apology on the part of the government is symbolically significant,
regardless of whether the political group in office was responsible for human rights
violations or not. It does not consist of an individual taking responsibility; rather it
involves a promise by the current government that it will not allow the country to return
to the dangerous state from which it has emerged. Sierra Leone’s president throughout
the time of the TRC, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, refused to issue a formal state apology for
the ten year war (Shaw 2005, 5). The TRC Chairman, Bishop Joseph Humper, supported
the president’s statements, contributing to victim’s hesitancy to reveal their stories, and
leading to wide-spread questioning of the unbiased nature of the TRC. The Chairman
went so far as to thank the pro-government militia, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), for
“defending the country” (Shaw 2005, 5).
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According to the TRC final report, the CDF were responsible for 5.9% of the
human rights violations during this conflict, which ranks them fifth among the twelve
perpetrator groups identified in the final report (Sierra Leone TRC Ap.1, 25). Their
violation types included disproportionately fewer property destruction violations, but
were higher than many of the perpetrator groups in the areas of assault/beating, torture,
detention, extortion, and sexual abuse. They had the highest proportion of abductions
among perpetrator groups (16.6%) (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 1, 26).
Koroma stated in a presentation to the APC: “President Kabbah made a statement
in Makeni that the North should apologize to the rest of the country because Foday
Sankoh, the RUF Leader has a northern name and is said to have hailed from the North.
This unfortunate statement caused great resentment among northerners who saw it not
only as a poor effort to disguise the real origin of the RUF but also as a deliberate attempt
to create a regional divide and fan ethnic animosity” (Koroma 2003).
The state chose not to apologize for the ten year war and the state decided on the
provision for blanket amnesty. The state has members serving in government positions
who were known ex-combatants and have no incentive to testify and apologize for their
actions; there is no risk of repercussion for not doing so. While encouraging the Sierra
Leonean people to utilize the commission and apologize for wrongdoings, the state’s
refusal to set an example by doing so does not lend itself well to conveying a guarantee
of non-repetition. Therefore, my overall assessment of the quality of public apology is
low. [Score: 1]
Averaging all sub-components of the category, I assign an overall score for the
guarantee of non repetition in Sierra Leone a 2.167.
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III)

Restitution
Restitution includes compensation for the victims, either paid by the government

or the perpetrators. In the testimonies given to the TRC, many Sierra Leoneans sought
monetary restitution which would enable them, in turn, to educate their children. They
also pointed to the lack adequate facilities and opportunities for education more
generally. Much of this was addressed under the section of rehabilitation.
b)

Compensation
i.

Monetary/Benefits

It took a long time for the government led reparations programs to actually get off
the ground in Sierra Leone. For years after the violence, there was an incongruity
between what compensation was promised, and the lack of action that was taken to
deliver on these promises. Over the past few years the situation has improved. In
response to the recommendations of the TRC final report, the government has created the
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which at the close of 2008 began
registering those who were eligible for reparations (Turay 2008). The commission
focuses on amputees, victims of sexual abuse, those severely wounded, and women who
lost husbands as a result of war and children. Registration centers are scattered around
Sierra Leone. Those who come provide some sort of documentation and the lists are
corroborated with other records such as testimonies of the TRC. They also seek out
known victims whose names are provided by the TRC. This program is exclusively for
victims who have not previously been compensated and excludes ex-combatants or
military. The government established a National Steering Committee which is comprised
of 19 major stakeholders including the office of the president, victims, and civil society
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groups to oversee the program and ensure meaningful and individualized benefit
packages for the victims (Koroma 2009). Hence, I rate the quality of monetary
compensation and benefits, medium-high. [Score: 2.5]
ii)

Community Service

Community service can be utilized as a way for perpetrators to apologize for their
actions and pay back their communities. In Sierra Leone there was a focus on
reintegration of ex-combatants, but it was primarily focused on providing them with a
means to support themselves and a community which would accept them rather than
paying back a community which they had harmed. There were also rehabilitation
programs for child ex-combatants which operated on a community level. However, there
was no significant community service program. As was explained earlier, perpetrators
did not typically take individual responsibility for their actions and thus there lacked a
program for them to repay the community. Given that there was no established
framework for community service, the category receives a low score. [Score: 1]
The sub-components comprising restitution varied in quality. The average score
for overall Restitution in Sierra Leone is 1.75
The comprehensive score for Restorative Justice comprised of averaging each
sub-component score, rehabilitation, the guarantee of non-repetition, and restitution, is
2.31 (i.e. a medium to medium-high level of restorative justice was achieved)
Therefore, the composite Reconciliation score resulting from the average of truth
and restorative justice, is 2.03 which signifies a medium level of reconciliation ultimately
achieved in Sierra Leone. (Truth-1.75, Restorative Justice- 2.31)
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Data Analysis Summary:
The following comparative tables contrast the performance of the two countries
analyzed and contrasted in this report. The specific indicators rated are included in an
overview diagram, figure 2 on page 21.
Table 7:
Truth:
Victim and perpetrator perception of the TRC and inclination to utilize it:
South Africa
Sierra Leone
1
3
Scope and Comprehensiveness of information gathered:
South Africa
Sierra Leone
1
2.5
Access v. restriction to the TRC
South Africa
3

Sierra Leone
3

Publicity and public awareness of the TRC
South Africa
3

Sierra Leone
2

Average:
South Africa
2.875

Sierra Leone
1.75

Restorative Justice:
Rehabilitation
Implementation of mechanism:
South Africa
1.5

Sierra Leone
3

Average:
South Africa
1.5

Sierra Leone
3

Guarantee of non repetition
Memorial efforts:
South Africa
3

Sierra Leone
3
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Government accountability for reform:
South Africa
Sierra Leone
2.5
2.5
State apology:
South Africa
3

Sierra Leone
1

Average:
South Africa
2.83

Sierra Leone
2.167

Restitution:
Monetary Compensation:
South Africa
2

Sierra Leone
2.5

Community Service:
South Africa
1

Sierra Leone
1

Average:
South Africa
1.5

Sierra Leone
1.75

Total truth average:
South Africa
2.875

Sierra Leone
1.75

Total restorative justice average:
South Africa
1.94

Sierra Leone
2.31

Total reconciliation average:
South Africa
2.41

Sierra Leone
2.03
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Critical to the goals of any TRC is the ability to achieve a balance between truth
and justice. The commission is expected to achieve a high score on each variable without
one being at the expense of the other. Simultaneously, the TRC must factor in a decision
on amnesty: whether to use it, and in what form. This automatically upsets the balance
between truth and justice. Amnesty is entered into the equation in order to yield a higher
level of truth with the understanding that the truth will also help to bring about a higher
level of restorative justice, while retributive justice is put to the side. There is an
expectation set forth that the benefits of some form of amnesty outweigh the costs, and
that forfeiting retributive justice will not ultimately come at the expense of reconciliation.
The two case studies, South Africa and Sierra Leone, approached this amnesty
decision in two different ways. South Africa employed conditional amnesty, maintaining
an option of retributive justice and setting up a transparent framework for the attainment
of amnesty. By contrast, Sierra Leone applied blanket amnesty and thereby foreclosed
the possibility of retributive justice in favor of a collective forgiveness and an expectation
of truth. Reconciliation in both cases was clearly impacted by the choice of differing
types of amnesty. In my comparative analysis of South Africa and Sierra Leone, the four
measures of reconciliation for which the countries had the largest score difference
include: victim and perpetrator perception of the TRC, scope and comprehensiveness of
information, implementation of rehabilitation mechanisms, and a state apology.
For the first measure of truth (i.e. the victim and perpetrator perception of the
TRC and inclination to utilize it) the South Africa TRC received a score of 3 because
victims utilized the commission to reveal their stories and apply for restitution.
Additionally, the provision of conditional amnesty provided a tangible incentive for
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perpetrators to come and testify before the commission, so that both sides of the story
were heard. Conversely, the perpetrators in Sierra Leone, whose TRC received a score of
1, did not typically feel compelled to testify for the commission when there was nothing
tangible to be gained, and in fact did not trust the commission itself. Likewise, the
victims did not trust that the benefits of piecing together a national history (which would
be comprised of primarily victim testimony) would outweigh the potential dangers of
revealing other’s wrongdoings, or speaking out against certain political groups.
The second measure which reflected a great disparity between the two cases is the
scope and comprehensiveness of information gathered. This is, again, a direct result of
the provision of amnesty. The TRC’s ability to gather an accurate historical record
depends upon gathering accounts from representative groups. If the perpetrators are not
inclined or motivated to testify, then a comprehensive perspective is absent from the
record. Additionally, the South African TRC was able to subpoena witnesses or
perpetrators which would then want to testify in exchange for amnesty and in order to
avoid punishment. These differences resulted in South Africa’s TRC score of 2.5 versus
Sierra Leone’s TRC score of 1.
In terms of a state apology, South Africa’s TRC received a score of 3 as a result
of both leaders (during and after the apartheid), offering apologies to the people of South
Africa. Sierra Leone’s TRC, which received a 1, maintained many of the same
government officials who were in place during the conflict and who did not take
individual responsibility for their actions. Nor did they have an incentive to do so, as a
result of the blanket amnesty.
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The final significant difference between the scores results from a difference in the
implementation of a rehabilitation mechanism. South Africa scored 1.5 while Sierra
Leone scored 3. Rehabilitation is an issue which is crucial looking forward. South
Africa clearly excelled in gathering truth but Sierra Leone ultimately scored higher in the
area of restorative justice. In future commissions, these two issues need to be addressed
simultaneously. Sierra Leone’s efforts toward rehabilitation and the reunification of its
people proved to be more comprehensive and effective than that of South Africa. The
measures in which South Africa scored lower in this area include rehabilitation
mechanisms and restitution. This is, in part, a result of a lack of follow through on the
part of the state.
A low point of both TRCs was community service. This is a powerful mechanism
which contributes to restitution and to restorative justice but was overlooked in both
cases. It is not as concrete as monetary restitution, but many aspects of the TRC are
symbolic (such as apologies and memorials) and these can be equally if not more
powerful and lasting. Looking forward, community service offers unexplored potential
and should be further investigated as a means to improve a restorative justice score.

Conclusion:
Ultimately, a TRC is a tool of transitional justice, meant to address wide spread
human rights violations, offer justice to the victims, and ultimately provide peace and
reconciliation to the state so that the people may unite and move forward as one (ICTJ
2010, What is Transitional Justice). A TRC is specifically mandated to compile a
complete historical truth and offer some form of justice (most typically restorative).
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According to my research, the provision of conditional amnesty utilized by South Africa
revealed a high level of truth while maintaining a medium level of restorative justice.
Therefore, South Africa’s reconciliation score surpassed the score resulting from Sierra
Leone’s blanket amnesty, and proved conditional amnesty to be the better option.
However, South Africa does need to focus on the follow-through of restorative measures
for them to adequately take the place of retributive justice. Should this be accomplished,
they could achieve a high score in both areas and thereby attain a high level of
reconciliation.
The South Africa TRC had the benefit of greater funding, more media attention,
and Archbishop Desmond Tutu as a charismatic leader of the commission; and yet Sierra
Leone was able to achieve a higher score in terms of restorative justice. Sierra Leone
compromised the level of truth and trust the commission achieved by employing blanket
amnesty in place of a conditional amnesty approach. However, Sierra Leone
implemented better rehabilitation and compensation mechanisms. The approaches of
South Africa and Sierra Leone can be joined in future commissions, by utilizing
conditional amnesty while focusing on restorative justice techniques, so as to best address
both components of reconciliation.
Overall, neither TRC was perfect; neither completely achieved the ultimate goal
of reconciliation. However, important steps were taken, many of which will set a
precedent for future commissions while others will provide lessons to be learned.
Significant aspects of these two commissions which future commissions could learn from
include South Africa’s approach to the TRC and conditional amnesty, which involved
three different committees and worked cooperatively with an external prosecution
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mechanism. This was a novel approach and provided additional organization and
structure, as well as the ability to reach out to the entire population and secure a
comprehensive truth. Looking forward, Kenya is expected to establish a Truth, Justice,
and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). Their Commission of Inquiry has highly
advised that this include a prosecution mechanism in order to achieve the “justice” aspect
(ICTJ 2010, Kenya). It is expected that Kenya will take many of the lessons learned from
South Africa’s TRC, but it will be interesting to note their approach to restorative justice,
whether they can fill in South Africa’s deficiencies.
Additionally, there is frequently debate surrounding whether heads of state should
apologize for the actions of a state whether or not they were directly responsible. In
South Africa there was considerable doubt surrounding the first diplomatic election and
whether the government would really turn over power. The apology from the old and
new governments was a milestone and set the stage for change and acceptance. Finally,
the popular support of Sierra Leone’s rehabilitation mechanisms and the effort to assist
and reintegrate all parties involved in the conflict (perpetrators, victims, witnesses, and
child ex-combatants) should surely be transferred to future commissions.
It is clear that a high score in one area of reconciliation is not sufficient to offset a
low score in another. Conditional amnesty proves to be the best approach in terms of
gathering truth, which automatically raises the level of restorative justice achieved;
however, it alone is unsatisfactory. Truth and justice are inherently intertwined, and there
needs to be a concerted effort toward both areas for reconciliation to be realized.
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Appendix A: List of Abbreviations

AC

Amnesty Committee

AFRC

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

ANC

African National Congress

APC

All Peoples Congress

ECOMOG

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group

HRVC

Human Rights Violations Committee

ICTJ

International Center for Transitional Justice

NP

National Party

NPRC

National Provisional Ruling Council

PAC

Pan-African Congress

PNDC

Provisional National Defence Council

RRC

Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee

RUF

Revolutionary United Front

SPSL

Special Court for Sierra Leone

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UN

United Nations

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

USIP

United States Institute of Peace
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Appendix B: South Africa: Map

(Central Intelligence Agency, South Africa)
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Appendix C: Sierra Leone: Map

(Central Intelligence Agency, Sierra Leone)
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Appendix D: South Africa: Conflict Timeline
1652- Dutch East India Company settled on the Cape of Good Hope and formed the first
permanent white settlement
Together with the other settling countries (Germany and France) they became
known as the Afrikaner
1700s- Dutch (known as Trekboers) expand their territory for farming and in so doing
move into the territory of the Koikhoi and San tribes
1785-1795- Trekboers are responsible for killing roughly 2500 San people and taking
about 700 (primarily children) into custody to become slaves
1795- British take control of Cape Town sparking conflict with the Afrikaner (or
Trekboers)
1836- “Great Trek” of the Afrikaner north into Zulu territory
1852 and 1854- Boar republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State were created
1870- Discovery of diamonds in Kimberly (Boar territory)
1886- Discovery of gold in Boar territory
1880-1881, and 1899-1902- Anglo-Boar Wars
May 1910- British colonies plus the two Boar republics created South Africa
1948- National Party (NP) won all-white election
Apartheid laws were created
1950- classification system enacted
1951- Bantu Authorities Act created “homelands”
1953- Public Safety Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed
1960- State of emergency declared in response to protests of black South Africans
Mass political violence and corruption followed for the next 25 years
May 1961- South Africa declared its self a republic, independent of Britain
1986- Government began talks with Mandela
February 1989- F.W. DeKlerk became president
1990- DeKlerk un-banned the ANC, PAC, and other anti-apartheid parties
1991- last “pillars of apartheid” were eliminated
December 1993- new constitution was created
1994- First non-racial elections
May 10, 1994- Nelson Mandela became president
December 1995-2002- Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) was mandated
February 3, 1997- new permanent constitution entered into force
2003- TRC final report was released publicly
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Appendix E: Sierra Leone: Conflict Timeline
1652- First freed slaves brought to Sierra Leone
1787- British helped 400 more slaves to Sierra Leone
1792- Freetown was established as British colony
Thousands more freed slaves would be brought to Sierra Leone
1951- Decolonization in the works
1961- Sierra Leone became independent with the British Commonwealth
1962- Sir Milton Margai, Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected Prime minister
1966- Sir Milton Margai dies and is replaced by half-brother, Sir Albert Margai
March 1967- All Peoples Congress (APC) won plurality of seats in parliament
April 1968- Siaka Stevens (APC leader) was declared by Parliament- Prime minister
1978- Constitution was amended to accept only APC as a political party
October 1985- APC (by Steven’s suggestion) named Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh
president in a one-party referendum
March 1991- Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began attacks on the eastern boarder of
Sierra Leone to gain control of the diamond mines and thereby pushed back Sierra
Leone army
April 29, 1992- Capt Valentine Strasser initiated a military coup which resulted in the
exile of Momoh to Guinea and established National Provisional Ruling Council
(NPRC) as ruling party of Sierra Leone
1995- RUF controlled most of the western side of Sierra Leone and was moving toward
Freetown
NPRC hired mercenaries to drive back RUF forces
April 1996- NPRC handed power over to civilian government, at which point Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah, a UN diplomat, won the Presidency
May 25, 1997- Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew President Kabbah
and proceeded to invite members of RUF into the new government
March 1998- Nigerian led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) overthrew AFRC and reinstated President Kabbah
This instigated much violence on the part of the RUF in Freetown
January 6 1999- rebels attacked Freetown
ECOMOG retaliated including them as active members of the conflict
July 7 1999- President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh signed Lomé Peace Agreement
1999-2000- United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established
2000- RUF violated Lomé Peace Agreement, held UNAMSIL members hostage
May 8, 2000- Members of RUF killed 20 anti-RUF demonstrators
Sankoh and various members of RUF were arrested and removed from government
positions
November 2000- new peace agreement signed in Abuja
Guinean forces attacked RUF bases in response to their attacks in Guinea
May 2001- second Abuja Agreement for peace was signed
disarmament proceeded
January 18, 2002- President Kabbah officially declared the civil war over
May 2002- President Kabbah was re-elected
Summer 2002- Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) opened
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) opened
October 2004- TRC released final report
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Appendix F: List of TRCs
Truth
Commission
Solomon Islands

Duration
2009-2010
(expected)

Kenya

2 years anticipated

Ecuador 07

2007-2009

Liberia

2006-2009

Morocco
Paraguay

2004-2005
2004-2008

Algeria

2003-2005

Chile 03
Democratic Republic of
Congo

2003-2005
2003-2007

Ghana

2003-2004

Sierra Leone
Timor-Lest (East Timor)
Serbia and Montenegro
Peru 01

2002-2004
2002-2005
2002-2003
2001-2003

Panama
Cote d'Ivoire

2001-2002
2000-2001

South Korea
Uruguay
Nigeria

2000-2004
2000-2002
1999-2002

Rwanda 99

1999-today

Guatemala
Ecuador 96
South Africa

1997-1999
1996-1997
1995-2002

Burundi
Germany 95
Haiti
Sri Lanka

1995-1996
1995-1998
1994-1996
1995-2000
19932007(?)

Ethiopia
Rwanda 93

1993

El Salvador

1992-1993

Germany 92

1992-1994

~

~
~
~

~

~

~
~

~

~

Amnesty?
blanket(mostly) amnesty, no self
incrimination
conditional amnesty, works with
prosecution
mandate-no amnesty,
results?
partial amnesty-children and more
minor crimes
blanket amnesty-don't name alleged
perpetrators
investigate--> contribute to prosecution
conditional amnesty, almost
blanket
blanket selfamnesty
blanket amnesty- for all but the worst
blanket self-amnesty built into
constitution
blanket amnesty-for those not in
tribunal
amnesty for minor crimes
not impartial, disbanded
no amnesty, can refer to prosecution
blanket amnesty because can't
conclude responsibilities
violence followed then amnesty-03
investigates, names perpetrators for
prosecution
blanket amnesty- Expiry Law
investigatory
no amnesty, gacaca-concession
program
no real prosecutions, perpetrators
names not given
not completed, see 07
conditional amnesty-if full disclosure
provisional amnesty- for all but the
worst
investigative- no amnesty provision?
investigative, prosecutions in the works
evidence can't be used in prosecutions
no amnesty- investigates and
prosecutes
no prosecutions- still problems in gov.94
blanket amnesty, even though
unconstitutional.
investigative- no amnesty provision?
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Chad

1991-1992

Chile 90

1990-1991

Nepal 90

1990-1991

Peru 86
Uganda 86

1986-1988
1986-1994

Argentina
Zimbabwe

1983-1984
1983-1984

Bolivia
Brazil
Uganda 74

1982-1984
1979-1982
1974

Mozambique

amnesty? Investigation, but little done
after
~

Protocol VI Cease-fire
collective amnesty for all sides

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2001

blanket amnesty-old regime still has
influence
investigative No
prosecutions?
ineffective with political influence-see
2001
investigative
Essentially blanket
amnesty
blanket amnesty, no formal report
only investigated disappearedunderfunded
blanket amnesty- but unofficial project

Protocol VI. (3) all prisoners, except for
those being held for ordinary crimes,
shall
be released by the parties
little diversity, ended without producing
final
report or recommendations

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) 2010
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 2010
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